

WHERE SHOULD I BE? THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER IN 2010: EFFECTIVE POSITIONING IN CONFLICT AND PLANNING

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
Major Joseph Buche
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United States Army Command and General Staff
College
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MAJOR JOSEPH BUCHE

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
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
Approved by:



COL William Puttmann, MMAS Monograph Director



COL Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS Director, School of Advanced
Military Studies



Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Director, Graduate Degree
Program

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ABSTRACT

WHERE SHOULD I BE? THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER IN 2010: EFFECTIVE POSITIONING IN CONFLICT AND PLANNING. By MAJ Joseph P. Buche, USA, 74 pages.

This monograph examines the most effective theater positioning of a US Forces operational commander in a conflict conducted in 2010. The monograph first defines who it is who practices operational command (differentiating between operational level and operational function). It then offers a test of utility of operation commander behavior to determine if a commander's positioning assists or detracts from the effectiveness of his or her command. Next, the monograph offers five historical vignettes that explore how the operational commander's therein exercised command. From this study the author presents a historical model that describes the effective methods of these historical commanders. After describing general environmental and technological changes likely to be in place twelve years from now, the monograph deduces modifications to the historical model which yield a model for the future.

The monograph concludes that technological improvements and environmental changes may produce a command post that offers a panacea of gadgets, information, and multi-dimensional illustrations. Effective operational commanders in 2010 will sometimes position themselves there to utilize these capabilities, but will avoid gluing themselves to this Schlieffen envisioned utopia. Instead, effective operational commanders will use technology to facilitate movement throughout their area of operations, normally using personal contact—and sometimes virtual contact—to ascertain truths and impart their intent.

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Introduction

Purpose

The introduction of operational art is a relatively recent concept in US Army doctrine. This does not indicate that the practice of operational art is a new phenomenon, though, but rather an acknowledgment of its utility in describing the battlefield. Operational art came into being during the last century.¹ This provides military history students several opportunities to study its practice. From this historical study one can then gain perspective, and thus make assumptions about its practice in the future more realistic. This monograph uses this convention to explore one aspect of the practice of the operational art: the positioning of the future operational commander that best facilitates his or her exercise of command.

Background

Whenever our forefathers "organized" conflict at the dawn of time, they found great utility in having their leader with them on the field of battle. The William Wallaces of the world led their "band" in war and peace.² That direct leadership provided many of the same benefits more modern scientific studies revealed long after those ancient battles were decided: immediate and personal access to information about the battle, expedient decision capability, moral strength for the led, the ability to gain and apply intuitive judgments about the battle, and other benefits. The leader's strategic purview—if one even cares characterize the leader's wider concerns in such grand terms—was very limited in scope. His tactical responsibilities generally extended only across what was literally one "field" or as far as he could see. There was every reason for the leader to be on the field and little or no reason for him to be elsewhere.

With the establishment of formal governments, a strategic level of emerged. This modification to how battle was organized generally found the strategic leader in overall command of the armies of his state.³ Up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, that strategic leader could still generally observe his force in battle. His wide ranging concerns of state might well exert some pressure for him to be elsewhere, but he found great utility in remaining on the battlefield and directing his armies. The loss of one climactic battle during this time might well have rendered his other strategic responsibilities moot.⁴

As early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, and as late as the 1860s—depending on to whom one listens—the operational level of war became a reality. Nation-states had come into being across the continents and found strategic leaders less often selected and retained primarily for combat prowess. These men were generally focused on the administration and diplomacy. Wars now exhibited distributed operations, durable formations, continuous logistics, and operational vision. These characteristics greatly erased the likelihood of a single climactic battle deciding the result of a war. Generals and admirals prosecuted campaigns to attain strategic results. We still had our William Wallace present in battles, and he still led his forces and wielded some implement intended to inflict bodily harm, but this newer version of Wallace was now simply a tactical leader. He was concerned with this battle, not the affairs of his nation, too. While different nations learned these lessons at different times, by World War II most participants acted as if they embraced the concept of an operational level of war,...even if they did not admit to the terms and theory per se.⁵

This reorganization of the battlefield—or more precisely, war—left operational level leaders in a quandary. The benefits of battlefield presence had changed slightly, but were still very much present. These leaders, having come up through the ranks of tactical leadership, felt the intuitive pull to be on the field of battle, but several factors drew them away from the battles, engagements, and even the campaigns under their command. Enhanced communications equipment made it easier to communicate with their subordinates and gave them less excuse to be out of communications with their strategic leaders. While coalitions had been fighting together since the sixteenth century, the second half of the twentieth century also brought with it a new emphasis for the US on coalition warfare. With that development came not only the requirement for strategic leaders to coordinate, but for operational leaders to do the same. Varying customs, comfort, and equipment routinely mandated such action take place in person and far from the battles. In addition, the importance (or perhaps the illusion of importance) of precise and controlled media relations seemed to require the commander to be closer to his starched fatigues and the briefing room than his helmet and the enemy's bullets.⁶

Organization

So then, from where should the circa 2010 US Forces operational commander exercise command? This monograph will attempt to provide an answer; albeit in an unconventional way. At this very time, in a place that a science fiction novel might describe as another dimension, a group of military professionals is gathering

to discuss this issue. It is a group of former soldiers with varied pedigrees. Some lived a long and fruitful life, while others met a seemingly early demise. Like their varied experiences, their opinions are diverse, too. It is not these individuals that are the story, though. Rather, it is their intellectual quest for understanding operational command.

Their cognitive voyage will take them through several intermediate objectives. First, they will attempt to refine that for which they search. They will collectively define precisely what question their discussion will answer. Second, they try to define the nature of operational command. They ask themselves questions like: at what level is it practiced, should they concern themselves with a contrast between an operational *function* and an operational *level*, and who executes either one? Next, they survey historical examples of command, considering whether it is *operational* command or not. From these observations they distill a historical model of effective operational command. Finally, they then take this historical model, consider how warfare will likely change in the next twelve years, and then develop a future model of from where a commander should exercise operational command in 2010.

One of the early intermediate objectives—the consideration of historical examples—is a very important one to the overall search. The conflicts at which the participants in this discussion look are purposely selected. They all take place after World War II, essentially the birth of our military's efforts at truly fighting joint. They also represent a pot pourri of types of limited war which US forces can expect to face in the foreseeable future. They begin with a look at Korea, a conventional conflict strategically constrained so as to prevent global war with China and/or the Soviet Union. Next the panel considers the Dominican Republic Crisis, a hemispheric intervention for which the US was ill-prepared strategically, operationally, and tactically. Then they look at Panama a quick one day "campaign" with its artistic strategic, operational, and tactical linkages. Moving forward in history brings them to Operation Desert Storm, another "conventional" fight with large land forces, but constrained strategically and operationally by coalition concerns. Finally, they discuss Somalia, a fight against hunger that looked initially like an elegant success and changed fairly suddenly to something far less. It is across this panoply of warfare that the panel begins its search for a few truths about operational command.

So now the reader need only relax back in the comfortable seat he or she has picked in the audience. The lights are dimming, and the crowd growing still. It sounds as if the proceedings are about to commence. Watch, listen, and consider the intellectual sojourn as it unfolds on the stage below.

Chapter 1

Where Do We Want To Go and How Will We Get There?

It was essentially a stage. Classifying it bare went a bit too far; spartan might be a better adjective. Six comfortable, though utilitarian, chairs sat in a gentle arc under fairly harsh light in the center of the stage with a dark curtain behind them. A kind of three dimensional screen appeared when the curtain was opened allowing the participants to swivel their chairs to see any action portrayed on the screen. They sat in stadium style elevated seating around the stage. It was a fairly effective forum given its intended purpose.

It was the panels that gathered there with great frequency that accomplished its purpose--discussion about and resolution of various issues concerning the past, present, and future. One gathering might attempt to find how WW I and the twentieth century would have progressed had Marshall Foch⁷ been injured and his military career ended by a riding accident when he was a junior officer. The next might explore information entropy--all agents in a system sharing the same level of information--and its impact on a free market economic system in the twenty-second century. The precise topic for these sessions was never really known in advance; the participants discussed and refined an issue of interest to them when they arrived.

Another interesting aspect of these panel discussions was the fact that principals never attended. If the discussion related to failed command perceptions and decisions regarding the closure of the Failise pocket, you wouldn't find Bradley, Eisenhower, or Patton there. Instead the panel might contain Bedell Smith, Chet Hanson, and Halley Maddox.⁸ No one ever questioned this tradition--perhaps it prevented hurt feelings and a forum for what might be sanctimonious proclamations. Even without the principals the discussions were always precise and logical. The panel sometimes failed to reach consensus, but never wandered from a meaningful and focused exploration of the topic.

The general subject for this particular proceeding was to be related to high level commanders and from where they should exercise command during a conflict. The panel's membership seemed to indicate that the panel would consider the US Army, and perhaps survey some relevant part of its history. John Matthew, Ridgway's WW II aide and a battalion commander in Korea; Cal Norman, an officer whose career had placed him as Schwarzkopf's subordinate on occasion (including service in CENTCOM headquarters during ODS/S); Carl Bruce, a junior officer during the Dominican Republic crisis; David Max, a member of the VXIII Corps staff during Operation Just Cause; Mark Thomas, a company commander during his service with US forces in Somalia; and Mary Hugh, a JTF staff officer during the Haitian intervention made up the panel.⁹

An announcement of sorts preceded their appearance on stage. After a short summary of their military accomplishments and experiences, they each walked on stage and stood in front of their assigned chairs. When the introductions were complete they exchanged a few pleasantries and took their seats.

"If you folks don't mind, I'd like to suggest our topic for today," began Matthew. Seeing no objection, he continued. "I'd like us to see if we can figure out where the operational commander should be on the battlefield."

"You assume he should be on the battlefield, then, John?" challenged Norman in the form of a question.

"Frankly, I had, Cal," answered Matthew. "Perhaps the question should be 'From where in theater should the operational commander exercise command?'" After a slight pause he added with a hint of a smile, "And, yes, I am assuming here that the commander should be in theater."

"I don't think 'theater' overly narrows the range of possibilities, John," said Hugh. "I think we can live with that. You didn't want to re-fight some campaign from the past, did you? While this contraption is certainly versatile, I'd really rather look to the future and use it for that instead of trying to rewrite history," continued Hugh while pointing behind her at the three dimensional screen.

"Good Lord, no. Let's look forward, not backward!" exclaimed Thomas. "There are just too many variables that pop up when we try to use that thing to see how a battle or war would have played out by changing one discrete practice or event."

"OK, then," said Matthew, already the informal leader of the group. "From where in theater should the circa 2010 US Forces operational commander exercise command during a campaign or operation? I hope that's detailed enough for all of us. How shall we proceed with this look *forward*?"

"John, we have a pretty good cross section of historical knowledge right here," interjected Max for the first time. "Let's first take a look at how a few successful commanders of the past exercised command and the utility of their actions. From there we can develop a historical model."

"I suggest that we also devine what advantage a commander hopes to gain through presence on the battlefield. I suppose by this I mean the same thing as you do when you say utility. Does commander presence provide smoother passage of orders, better understanding of intent, increased morale for the fighting force, better situational awareness for the commander, or some combination thereof?"

"How do we move that historical model forward to 2010?" asked Thomas, returning the conversation to Max's last point. "I guess we need an understanding of how the environment of combat—more specifically command in combat—changes from the past to the future. I think that the C² equipment and capabilities may be the most significant changes, but by no means the only ones."

"I agree, Mark," said Matthew. "We need to understand the capabilities and limitations of their command and control systems when we look at differing historical examples. We also need to understand how each individual commander we study fit into their specific command structure. This has both a doctrinal component and a concern with what their superiors and subordinates expected of them. You know, either one of the Moltke boys positioned themselves differently than did Hugh Shelton more for technological, doctrinal, and command structure specific reasons than simply for any conceptual disagreement on the exercise of command."¹⁰

"I suggest, too, that we come to grips with how we define the 'battlefield,'" said Norman.

"I don't follow you, Cal," responded Hugh. "We already agreed to remove that reference from our question."

"We have," began Norman. "You've got to admit, though, that our definition of that term or space will come up in our discussions. That may well be the answer we come up with. I suggest that we all have slightly different definitions of the battlefield. I know that historically the definition has changed some. Think about it. In World War II we could have defined the battlefield as, say, that area forward of the committed brigades' or even divisions' rear boundaries. If we were considering the Falklands campaign, we could say that the islands themselves and perhaps an additional 10 kilometers of water around the islands represented the 'battlefield.' That would give us an easy geographical framework that defines the battlefield."

"Agreed."

"So how should we define it for an operation like the US' occupation of Haiti or for their Hurricane Andrew relief operations?" asked Norman.

"I can solve that," answered Bruce. "Let us agree to consider only conflicts, and not relief efforts as we go through this."

"So all you want is to study essentially twentieth century Napoleonic operations?" challenged Hugh. "This will be a short discussion indeed. So few conflicts in the beginning of the twenty-first century will entail only the clash of armored corps that its simply not worth discussing. I think the trend is for smaller and quicker quasi-conflicts, not what we saw in Korea or one of the World Wars."

"I don't disagree with you, Mary. You miss my point, though," responded Bruce. "I don't recommend we only consider what we might call traditional wars: symmetric enemies, a focus on attrition, staff officers breaking out the party hats when our main effort slams into theirs—the kind of enemies and situations that the US had for seemingly all its simulations in the late 1990s.¹¹ Instead I recommend we narrow our discovery to situations in which man isn't trying only to rectify some human or environmental suffering—some act of nature, disaster relief, or similar event—but instead is actually opposing some type of armed human opposition."

"I need to summarize this stuff, my esteemed colleagues," said Matthew with a wry smile. "Remember, I'm a bit more long in the saddle than the rest of you. By my understanding we've so far agreed to the following..."

Matthew wrote his version of the agenda on a nearby board.

Question: From where in theater should the circa 2010 US Forces operational commander exercise command during a campaign or operation?

- Survey selected historical operational commanders to determine how they exercised command:
 - Consider impact of their C2 equipment and organization.
 - Consider the unique aspects of that commander's role in that command structure.
 - Determine the utility of that commander's actions.
- Develop a historical model.
- Determine how changes to the environment found in the historical model to those likely to be present in 2010 will modify the model.
- Develop a future model.

Loose Ends:
*Definition of
"The Battlefield"

"Now I added the 'loose ends' piece based on our earlier discussion. We do have some definitions we need to tighten up," said Matthew. "But, I think we can do that in stride; no need to cement them up front. Let's start our discussion of our selected historical examples and firm up our definitions as we see the need."

As if on cue all the participants gave silent signals of assent, took a drink, and settled back in their chairs.

Chapter 2

Who Conducts Operations?

"I'd like to approach this chronologically if you all don't mind," said Thomas, "I trust we all have some knowledge of the topic. As John has already mentioned, we seem to have a pretty good cross section of the history the US military for the latter part of the twentieth century represented here. How about each of us in turn leads the discussion through our own area of expertise?"

"I never mind getting the first chance to speak," said Matthew with a glint in his eye. "As long as Mary and Cal can hold their tongues till the end."

"He didn't say we couldn't speak until the end, John," replied Hugh. "Just that we wouldn't lead the discussion until then. You can rest assured; Cal and I will find reason to say something before that time comes."


A few good-natured smiles permeated the group. Through his own smile, Matthew began.

"General Ridgway was an electric personality; a natural leader and warrior," said an almost reverential Matthew. "I think he realized that about himself. He also thought that one of a commander's primary roles was motivating his subordinates. Call it imposing his will or just providing energy, but he knew how to do it and expected other commanders to do the same. In his mind, commanders were forward; and by forward I mean in a position to see the action and be seen. He provided us with a rather pure example of this during the World War II Normandy invasion. As a division commander right after the parachute landings he had little combat power he could provide the battalions in contact, but still he went to the area of the most intense combat because he understood how much his subordinates—both leaders and followers—gained from seeing him there sharing their lot and exposing himself to danger.¹² Now, I understand that a WW II division commander was not an operational commander, but..."

"Exactly, John," interjected Hugh. "I apologize for interrupting, however I think we need..."

"You didn't want to wait long, did you, Mary?" said a laughing Norman. "Even I wasn't going to leap in during the first thirty seconds."

Levels of War

Level	What They Do	Who Does It
Strategy	Determines national/multinational security objectives, develops and uses national resources to accomplish same, sequences initiatives; defines limits/assess risks for the use of instruments of national power develops global plans	NCA (Pres, SecDef CJCS, JCS)
Operations	Plans, conducts, & sustains campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives. Links tactics and strategy by sequencing events, initiating actions, and applying resources. Provides the means to strategically exploit tactical successes.	
Tactics	Plans and executes battles and engagements to accomplish military objectives. Focuses on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives	Echelons Below Corps

"Let's face it," he said when he'd finished writing. "We're trying to solve for what goes in the box under the question mark. If there are three levels of war—and we seem to agree on that—then if we figure out who works in the highest domain and who works in the lowest, we ought to be able to figure out who is in the middle.¹⁸ For the sake of argument, I've made our middle box a little too big—including echelons there that are only arguably members on occasion. For example, we could argue that corps are tactical formations, not operational ones, but I think that's a tangential argument."

"Including corps in the operational level box makes some sense for another reason," said Hugh. "Right now the US Army trains corps headquarters to fight as JTFs with some staff augmentation. These guys and gals think JTF pretty naturally. Since the consensus seems to point to JTFs as operational, including corps doesn't seem to be a great leap."

"Accepting this paradigm," said Bruce. "It's clear that the middle box contains CINCs, and commanders of corps, field armies, army groups, theater armies, and JTFs. Keep in mind that I don't mean that the commander of every corps or even JTF on the battlefield is an operational commander, just that they could be depending on the design of the theater and/or campaign."

Quiet nods of assent went around the room. Only one participant didn't agree immediately. Cal Norman rubbed his chin while still looking at Max's diagram on the board. The others sensed his reluctance to agree and waited for him to speak.

"To some extent I think we're barking up the wrong tree here," Norman began. "There's a difference between the operational level of command and the operational function—the practice of operational art.¹⁹ Now, I think one has to be at the operational level of command in order to practice operational art, but an operational level commander isn't always practicing operational art."

Silence greeted what might have been a rhetorical question. Norman waited a few instants to let his statement sink in before he continued.

"Here's my own chart. I've tried to identify the operational *level* by using some characteristics from the doctrine we've already discussed and some theoretical writings about changes in warfare that necessitated the emergence of operations. This body of theory talks about requisite characteristics of the formations that conduct operations—the operational level—and talks about some requisite behaviors—the operational *function*.²⁰"

Operational Level or Operational Function?

Operational Level

- An echelon at which the commander sequences tactical battlefield events so as to achieve strategic ends.
- Characterized by the ability to:
 - conduct deep maneuver and battles extended in time and space while unified by a common aim
 - integrate several simultaneous and successive distributed operations
 - sustain continuous logistics
 - practice relative real time C²
 - conduct a distributed deployment

Operational Function

- Actions by a commander at the operational level practicing operational art.
- Characterized by:
 - communication of relevant, speedy perceptive cognition (operational vision)
 - executing actions focused on the retention of freedom of action (initiative)
 - the presence of an active, dynamic, and responsive enemy
 - an effort to dislocate the enemy

"So, if you folks will buy into this," continued Norman after several moments. "It seems to me that corps and above is about right for formations capable of conducting operations; I agree that's the operational level.²¹ But, I recommend that we consider only those commanders at that level and performing an operational function—practicing operational art—as we divine our model from history."

After the briefest of pauses he continued by adding almost matter-of-factly, "And frankly, if a commander is not practicing the operational art, why should he or she behave differently than would a tactical commander?²² Think about it. A platoon leader talks to his company commander, someone who runs an organization three to four times the size of his own and with a broader scope of weapons, communications, and responsibilities. The same thing is true all the way up the chain of command. My point is that if I'm not a strategic leader, nor am I *functioning* differently than my tactical

subordinates, I can position myself to exercise command as I would if I were merely another tactical commander running an organization larger than those of my subordinates. Doesn't that make sense?"

"I don't know that we agree on any of these points, my friend," said Thomas. "For one thing, the dialogue with strategic leaders required of an operational commander is distinct from communications with his tactical subordinates just by their very nature. I think as we look at our historical examples we will see that. For another thing, I think you may have taken a bit of a skewed route to arrive at your description of the operational function. Up there you have some characteristics, some things people have observed in hindsight as they tried to figure out when armies 'discovered' operations. Any time you look at something ex post facto and deduce the characteristics, what you've got are the characteristics in use at that specific time or times, not those required at all times. Essentially you deduce a truth, not the truth."

"You're saying that if I want to understand what needs to be present to go from Leavenworth to Kansas City, then I can look back in history," said Hugh trying to understand Thomas' point. "I see that historically Mr. X made the trip on Tuesday, in his car, wearing sunglasses, and along Highway 45. If I deduce that all trips from Leavenworth to Kansas City must include a car moving along Highway 45, sunglasses, and a tank of gas, then I'm missing the bubble, right?"

"Exactly," responded Thomas. "It's entirely possible that *most* people have done the same thing as Mr. X. But if we simply make deductions based on this historical practice, then we miss the possibilities of train rides, plane rides, cars with only a half tank of gas, or many other ways to get from Leavenworth to Kansas City."

"I think the operational function," he continued. "Is the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations, through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.²³ I'm doing that when I sequence military actions and resource them such that they produce military conditions that achieve strategic goals.²⁴ That's the function. What you described, Cal, is a set of common characteristics. There's a subtle distinction."

Norman paused and considered his colleague's thoughts. Before he answered Matthew's scribbling at the board drew everyone's attention.

performance and results in World War II, and his understanding of the theater and strategic situation, having just left the Department of the Army Headquarters as the serving DCSOPS, gave him some freedoms that others might not have enjoyed as the Eighth Army commander.²⁶ MacArthur felt comfortable with him—at least more so than his predecessor, Walker.²⁷

"In terms of how he commanded, Ridgway made a great deal of making personal contact with his subordinates. For him that was truly an essential element of command. He arrived in Korea to take command of 8th Army in the evening a few nights after Christmas. The *next morning* he immediately went forward to visit every division and corps commander in his command.²⁸ That move in and of itself is telling. How many others would instead get an overview brief from their staff before meeting with subordinate commanders?"

"You'd better talk about the grenade," Norman told Matthew. "That was better than a set of pearl handled revolvers any day."

"Ridgway also understood the effect of his image on his soldiers," Matthew responded. "Perhaps he understood its effect on the enemy as well. His telltale pose in Korea was one in which he was wearing combat dress with a grenade taped to his shoulder strap.²⁹"

"Ridgway also understood sacrifice and wasn't willing to accept the corrupting comforts that could easily accrue to a senior commander. He traveled to Korea without taking an aide with him.³⁰ When he visited units in Korea he did so in an open topped jeep.³¹ He did things like this for pragmatic reasons. Taking an aide along would have slowed his arrival in theater. Having no top on his vehicle allowed him the chance to dismount quickly if ambushed. But he also did them for the effect he knew they would have on his subordinates. Soon after taking command he directed that his army's forward command post move well north, along with the staff officers now living fairly comfortably and securely much farther south. He thought it hard for staff officers living in comfort to identify with soldiers living in deprivation.³² Another example has to do with something as simple as his gloves. When he arrived in theater he found he had brought only one set of gloves, dress gloves. He wore those gloves for several days before he got a suitable pair.³³ Again, it would have been easy for an army commander

to simply demand a new set of gloves, but Ridgway understood the effect that would have on his command. He knew that was more important than his fingers."

"OK, clearly you see Matthew Bunker Ridgway as a warrior god," said Hugh, chastising Matthew a bit. "But operational commanders really need to be more than a grenade and a bucket full of 'Hua.'"³⁴

"I read a lot today about 'vision' as if it were a new phenomenon," responded Matthew. "Ridgway certainly had operational vision, though he didn't call it that. Fairly shortly after arriving in Korea he asked his staff to recommend to him three lines at which they thought that UN forces should be in thirty days, sixty days, and then 180 days. His staff subsequently recommended a withdrawal—essentially back to Pusan. Ridgway told them they could forget that. They were going to attack; those lines would be north, not south.³⁵ That may seem pretty trivial, but that's the kind of act that transmits the commander's idea of what tomorrow should look like to his subordinates.

"Vision or not, it does sound as if he had a good *feel* for what was going on at the front," observed Norman, as much to himself as to anyone else.

"It is important to note that his visits forward also gave him an understanding of the terrain, how ground lines of communication were being maintained, an intuitive feel for the effectiveness of battlefield circulation control, and several other factors," said Matthew in response. "Traveling through his command gained him insight into the various aspects of logistics at work in his army, not just how the fighting was going on."³⁶

"One other factor that Ridgway really thought important was the use of a chief of staff or deputy. Ridgway essentially anointed one of these two subordinates to make decisions in his absence. He saw the need for these trusted agents to be inside the head of the commander. They should think as the commander thinks and act as he would act. He wanted them to develop with him such a level of mutual confidence and understanding that he was able to generate what amounted to an alter ego; almost another commander. While the real McCoy is out and about, the alter ego is available in the headquarters, able to make decisions and execute because he thinks as does his boss.³⁷ With the

possible exception of the importance of personal observation and interaction, I don't know that Ridgway saw anything as more important than this."³⁸

"I've generally talked up to now about Ridgway's time as the army commander. But his behavior didn't change much when he became the theater commander. Now, he understood that different echelons of command required different things from their commanders, this was particularly true of his move from army command to that of theater commander.³⁹ He had a much broader scope of responsibility, but his techniques of command changed little."⁴⁰

"Even in his new position, he still ventured forward. In this aspect he behaved differently than did MacArthur. There is no question that MacArthur was personally courageous.⁴¹ Even as a five star general at the age of seventy he braved mortar rounds and an advancing enemy in the earliest days of the Korean war so that he could see and assess enemy dispositions.⁴² When large offensive operations began he would journey from Japan for the event.⁴³ But in both cases his actions increased his understanding of the enemy and terrain, and allowed journalists to tell this story to those separate from the battle.⁴⁴ In Ridgway's case, he was concerned about personal contacts with those fighting the battle. He was also concerned about his presence being known to his subordinates.⁴⁵ Ridgway was interested in understanding the environment of the battlefield, not just the enemy,...or the press."

"You know," began Thomas. "It's tough to argue the utility of Ridgway's actions. Look at the impact he had on the battlefield. His presence was felt all the way down the chain of command to the smallest tactical formations.⁴⁶ Soon after his

Ridgway

- Personal contact with subordinates forward.
- Forward presence creates perception of subjecting himself to the jeopardy of the battlefield.
- Warrior image visible to fighters.
- Importance of the executive agents' and staff's role in the exercise of command so as to free commander to move around the battlefield more freely.
- Shared Vision through personal contact with staff and commanders.
- Observe rear operations while transiting the AO to analyze quality of support.

arrival not only had a previously beaten army stopped the Chinese advance, but soon thereafter, the Chinese began to retreat themselves.⁴⁷ This guy was doing something right."

A few murmurs of assent preceded everyone's attention turning once again to the board where Matthew had again been writing. They all briefly looked at the bullet summary of Ridgway's techniques of command.

After a reasonable interlude to read his summary on Ridgway in Korea, Matthew flipped back to the "Utility Test" the group had earlier developed.

"Let's ensure we *aren't* arguing about that utility," he began. "Here's our 'test' of the commander behavior. Beside each of the characteristics I will place a positive sign, a negative sign, or a zero to indicate these characteristics' effect on Ridgway's ability to effectively execute the operational function. You all tell me if there're one or more of my evaluations that don't represent consensus."

Utility Test of Operational Commander Behavior

Does the commander...

- Design, organize, and conduct campaigns and major operations?
- Sequence military actions and resource them such that they produce military conditions that achieve strategic goals?
- Effectively communicate an operational vision?
- Execute actions that will facilitate freedom of action?
- Attempt to dislocate the enemy?

"Now, remember," he added. "As we do this, we're looking at these with an eye toward where it was that the commander exercised command. Some of his actions may be simply style and not relate specifically to his positioning."

"Well," interjected Hugh. "Some of those things that are style may only be possible to do given a specific positioning."

"I agree, Mary," came Matthew's response. "I'm just trying to keep us from getting wrapped around the axle trying to deal with those characteristics that have no relationship to positioning."

Ridgway

- (+) Personal contact with subordinates forward.
- (+) Forward presence creates perception of subjecting himself to the jeopardy of the battlefield.
- (+) Warrior image visible to fighters.
- (+) Importance of the executive agents' and staff's role in the exercise of command so as to free commander to move around the battlefield more freely.
- (+) Shared Vision through personal contact with staff and commanders.
- (+) Observe rear operations while transiting the AO to analyze quality of support.

With that, Matthew filled in the chart on Ridgway.

"Any arguments with this?" he asked.

"I'll admit that I don't understand enough to know if I want to argue, John," said a plaintive Bruce to the giggles of the rest of the panel.

"Consider the last bullet, Carl," answered Hugh before anyone else could respond. "By observing rear operations and analyzing the quality of support Ridgway was better able to design, organize and conduct major operations, resource military actions, etc. If any of these characteristics had tended to generate a 'No' answer from our utility test questions we would've put down a minus sign. If the characteristic produces a mix of 'Yes' and 'No' responses, then it gets a neutral."

"OK," said Bruce. "No arguments here."

Operation Power Pack

Before he gave anyone else a chance to redirect the group's attention, Bruce began his overview of the Operation Power Pack.

"Both Ridgway and Bruce Palmer entered their conflicts when the fighting was already going on. In fact, it's interesting to understand how Palmer got the job of Commander, US Forces Dominican Republic. This may have been one of the first examples in which strategic leaders wanted someone they saw as a political general as the commander on the scene. The fighting on the island had already begun in earnest for US forces. Despite the fact that the US had a three star flag officer, VADM Masterson, in command in the area, President Johnson told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff to "get the best general (he had) in Washington and send him down there to take command.' Clearly here was a national leader who wanted the senior military man on the ground to understand the political environment well.⁴⁸ Palmer didn't disappoint Johnson in his understanding of the political and strategic concerns. For example, he later made it clear that he decided early on to stick very close to the American ambassador in country. He was happy that he did.⁴⁹

"I feel certain that Ridgway had a similar appreciation of political and strategic constraints as the theater commander," said Matthew with a smile. "Particularly given the circumstances of his predecessor's departure."⁵⁰

A few good natured chuckles permeated the group.

"In contrast to Ridgway," Bruce continued. "Palmer became what was in essence a sub-unified commander almost as soon as he arrived.⁵¹ That's not to say that the command structure was that clear at all, though. From the first US military actions in this crisis it was unclear for whom many of the participants actually worked, and to whom they reported. One rather extreme example of this was provided when Palmer landed at Fort Bragg and informed the commander of XVIII Corps of the personal directive from the CJCS, General Wheeler, for Palmer to go to Bragg, collect a small headquarters, and proceed to the Dominican Republic to command US Forces there. The commander of the corps had heard nothing of the directive and was a bit incensed over the whole affair.⁵²

"The confusion didn't end there, though. When Palmer arrived on the island itself and informed General York, the commander of the 82d Airborne and the ground forces commander until then, that Palmer was now assuming command of the ground forces, it didn't make York all that happy, either. That's not all that surprising; most of us would rather be in charge of all that we see than have our boss right over our shoulder and him or her have that authority. That aside, now York could concentrate on his fight instead of reporting up to the strategic and political levels.⁵³ That's an important point, I think, about command at the operational level. That level of command should shield the tacticians to fight."

"Sounds like Palmer fought the conflict differently than did Masterson," came Thomas' assessment.

"Palmer arrived to take command and took several hours on the island to assess the situation," continued Bruce. "As I said earlier, he was initially not a joint force commander, but instead reported to VADM Masterson, the CJTF at that time.⁵⁴ He quickly assessed the fact that the terms of the cease fire in effect at that time were militarily unsound. As such, he informed his subordinate, York, to ignore those provisions as he now considered them void. Masterson, who had personally agreed to the terms, lacked an understanding of their impact, perhaps given his decision to command the operation while afloat."⁵⁵

"You know," began Norman. "Just by their nature and experience, we may find that marines and soldiers will be more likely to exercise command from a more forward position than their main command post than their navy and air force counterparts.⁵⁶ While senior commanders seem to understand the different requirements of operational versus tactical command, they rarely have the opportunity to practice operational command in several billets, unlike their ability to practice tactical command in several billets. It's easy to use techniques and mental models derived from decades of experience."⁵⁷

"The distinction between from where Palmer and from where Masterson exercised command was not just a contrast in the type of command post, though," continued Bruce. "As I said, one of the things on which Palmer focused was staying close to the ambassador. In fact he made a point of moving to the embassy before the area around it was free from gunfire.⁵⁸ He knew that a close and personal relationship with the ambassador was important. While it would have been possible to talk with the ambassador from a command post afloat, routine visits wouldn't have been possible, and certainly not the personal interaction he gained from establishing his headquarters next door to the embassy."

"As we get back to a comparison and contrast between Palmer and Ridgway, we need to understand that Palmer had better communications with his superiors than did Ridgway."

"That's gotta be true," said Matthew. "Ridgway's communications with his superiors as both the army and theater commander were generally written message traffic."

"Palmer had pretty good secure voice capability along with message capability. That voice capability wasn't always a good thing, though. Even though his operational superior was the CINCLANT, that didn't stop a whole lot of folks from talking directly to him either from above or around the CINC."⁵⁹

"What about the media's role in this conflict?" asked Hugh. "How did Palmer handle the press?"

"How did Ridgway, for that matter?" added Norman.

"Ridgway trusted the press in Korea," said Matthew. "He knew a few of the correspondents from World War II. Soon after his arrival he spoke with the correspondents covering the war. He frequently gave them classified information and allowed them to use their judgment as to what and when to print. He said they never let him down."⁶⁰

"Information flowed more quickly for the press in the Caribbean in the mid-sixties than it did in Korea in the early fifties," began Bruce. "Palmer became disappointed with the press. He thought he had given them unvarnished facts and they came to skewed assessments. He thought this gave the American public the wrong impression about the operation."⁶¹ Frankly, his dissatisfaction with the press may have been a result of the fact that his superiors weren't always forthcoming with the media. For example, President Johnson and the CJCS, General Wheeler, made it clear to Palmer that he had a public mission and a private one. Publicly, he was to protect Americans in the middle of the conflict. Privately, he was to prevent the birth of another Cuba.⁶² It didn't take many people long to figure out that dichotomy. They likely didn't distinguish between Palmer and his bosses in Washington as they judged the integrity of the various statements they received."

"We should all remember that Ridgway dealt with radio and print media," added Max. "Palmer was at the dawn of the TV news explosion. That had an effect on who the journalists were and how much depth went into some of their reporting."⁶³

Matthew had been at the board during this discussion, too. He had dutifully recorded another bullet list of key points about Palmer's command

Palmer

- Personal interaction and coordination with political and strategic leaders. (Understanding of strategy and politics.)
- Well forward; in a position to observe and appreciate tactical realities.
- Made himself available to media; had an appreciation of their impact.
- Kept strategic leaders informed through periodic voice communications so as to shield tactical fighters to fight.

methods. As the group surveyed his notes, he flipped the group's utility test back up on the board.

"Here's our test of utility, folks," he told them. "let's go through the list and see how we evaluate the characteristics I've recorded."

"Both the first characteristic and the last deserve a plus sign," began Hugh. "These helped him stay abreast of the strategic goals as he prosecuted the fight. That communication probably even helped him shape the strategic goals."

Utility Test of Operational Commander Behavior

Does the commander...

- Design, organize, and conduct campaigns and major operations?
- Sequence military actions and resource them such that they produce military conditions that achieve strategic goals?
- Effectively communicate an operational vision?
- Execute actions that will facilitate freedom of action?
- Attempt to dislocate the enemy?

"Somebody tell me how this helps us determine from where he exercised command," protested Norman. "We're not talking about a spot on the ground, here, but rather keeping his superiors informed."

I think you're wrong, there, Cal," countered Hugh. "While we're not talking about his positioning relative to the ground here, we are talking about positioning. In this case, it's in relationship to strategic communications means instead of in relation to the ground. That's still positioning."

"His forward positioning also meets one of our utility test elements," said Thomas, moving on to another point. "It assisted in his subordinates understanding his vision and, certainly in the case of his directing York to disregard the cease fire, promoted the execution of actions that facilitated freedom of action."

"Wait a minute, John," said Max. "We shouldn't be glorifying operational commanders positioning themselves so far forward. That's a great way for them to get in the way, not help.⁶⁴ I think we change that second bullet to a neutral."

"Remember, Dave, we're not pulling this stuff out of our fourth point of contact," responded Norman. How did Palmer's actions cause us to say 'No' to any of our Utility Test questions?"

"I don't think that his specific actions generate a 'No' answer in this specific case," began Max. "But I think that..."

"Sorry, friend," interrupted Norman. "That's why we have the test applied to the vignettes. We're working this issue in ways other than just saying, 'Well I think that...' We consider what happened and apply our test. Frankly, you've answered your own objection."

Max didn't offer a rebuttal.

Thomas continued the discussion by saying, "I don't think the bullet about his behavior with respect to the media is either positive or negative. While it certainly relates to positioning—you have to position yourself with the media to personally give them information—I don't think it gives us either a yes or no answer to the questions that make up our test. In short, John, I say you put a zero in front of that bullet."

Matthew scribbled on the board for a few seconds and then presented it for the group's approval or discussion. Receiving neither, he flipped to a clean section and asked Max to

proceed with his discussion of Operation Just Cause.

Max simply nodded and began his own historical vignette.

Operation Just Cause

"Operation Just Cause is distinct from the examples we've discussed up till now in a few key ways. In 1989 we had the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) who would serve his full term empowered by the Goldwater-Taft Defense Reorganization Act.⁶⁵ In addition to that generic fact, the incumbent CJCS, Collin Powell, wielded influence within the administration well beyond the authority granted him by that piece of legislation.⁶⁶ All this appeared to make it easier to fight a joint operation instead of an operational that had been subdivided so as to include more than one service.⁶⁷ This example also allows us to view a circumstance in which the operational commanders took part in the planning before the operation and then executed it; they didn't get on board only after the fighting started."

Max paused momentarily before adding, "Now that I think about it, this may be one piece that Cal's model of the operational function seems to exclude. Clearly campaign planning is within the purview of the operational commander.⁶⁸ Cal's model seems to desire a commander executing the

Palmer

- (+) Personal interaction and coordination with political and strategic leaders. (Understanding of strategy and politics.)
- (+) Well forward; in a position to observe and appreciate tactical realities.
- (0) Made himself available to media; had an appreciation of their impact.
- (+) Kept strategic leaders informed through periodic voice communications so as to shield tactical fighters to fight.

campaign before that commander is performing the operational function. I think operational planning—campaign planning—counts as an operational function.”⁶⁹

“There’s also a similarity that all these examples to date share,” said Bruce genteelly interrupting Max. “It’s the political and strategic connection.”

“Pardon me, Carl,” said Norman with more than a little sarcasm seemingly dripping from his speech. “I understand your urge to pile on here now that Max just called me an idiot. But does this mean that you’ve just discovered that the operational commander has some type of relationship to strategy. This is indeed a revolutionary espial!”

“I am prepared to go one step deeper,” responded Bruce with a smile. “The only reason that Thurman got the CINC’s job was because the civilians in the chain of command lost confidence in General Woerner, the man who had been the CINC.⁷⁰ Now, I don’t mean to infer that the removal of Woerner and Masterson from their command positions was the same type of action taken with respect to MacArthur, but there is a similarity in each of these examples. In each case the political strategic leaders chose the operational commander based on that officer’s congruence with the higher level policies. In each case it wasn’t a question of the man in the position just acting on some written set of strategy. Rather, men were *replaced* in command specifically for a perceived ability or willingness to pursue strategic aims or at least avoid trampling on them.”⁷¹

“So we’re saying that Thurman was the operational commander for Just Cause. Is that right, Max?” asked Hugh while offering a gentle segue back where she wanted the conversation to go.

“I think two commanders shared operational responsibility here,” said Max. “I certainly don’t think you can say only Thurman was an operational commander. He deliberately selected Steiner’s XVIII Airborne Corps because it was a capable warfighting headquarters.⁷² Thurman did this based on his own assessment that the SOUTHCOM staff was not capable of performing as such.⁷³ Steiner and XVIII Corps planned the campaign, one of the things we discussed earlier as evidence of operational level and function.⁷⁴ But that doesn’t mean that Thurman completely gave up his role as an operational commander. Despite his determination to have Steiner be the warfighter, Thurman made a few key decisions both in planning and execution about the timing and conduct of the operation—he

was still clearly involved in Just Cause as more than merely a CINC monitoring the progress of a subordinate's battle(s).⁷⁵

"Contrasting this with some of our earlier examples, it's clear that information velocity and reach was much greater than that to which Palmer was exposed a little over twenty years earlier. The technology was available for the national strategic leadership to listen to discrete tactical events during the execution of the operation. The SecDef, CJCS, and members of the JCS sat in the National Military Command Center during the operation getting near real time reports of what was occurring. Now they rarely interceded, but did on occasion."⁷⁶

"Why do you say that's significant, Dave?" asked Thomas.

"During this operation, and likely for operations in the future, strategic leaders had the ability to exercise near real time control over the battles," came Max's reply. "The potential for a strategic leadership interfering with an operational commander's fight was clearly defined."⁷⁷

"The support for, and concern about, the media was another issue. The plan called for tactical surprise. Along these lines several measures were taken to ensure operational security. Rehearsals were held on the actual objectives both to desensitize the Panamanians and the media to operations in those areas."⁷⁸ (A side benefit of this was a chance to inculcate the commander's vision on his forces through practice.) In addition to that, the media pool system which had been conceived to allow journalists access to military operations didn't work well. Militarily inexperienced journalists participated in the pool for this operation. In an effort to ensure operational security Secretary of Defense Cheney didn't authorize alerting the pool in time for its members to accompany the initial forces.⁷⁹ Without access to unfiltered information about events as they happened, members of the media became easily skeptical of the veracity of the information they received through official channels."

"What about the chain of command for this operation?" asked Bruce. "You've heard how ours was flawed, confused, and fluid. How was the one for Just Cause."

"Early in the planning process the plan envisioned a somewhat cumbersome and changing structure" responded Max. "Luckily, by the time we executed everyone up through the Secretary of Defense insisted on the chain of command being as 'short and clean as possible.'"⁸⁰

"Any other distinctions or similarities that you think may relate to our quest, Dave?" asked Matthew, already at the board trying to summarize the discussion.

"Three things come to mind, John," said Max. "The first point has to do with information. Like our first two examples, Thurman liked to get information first hand and in person. While vacationing in the states he received word of the attack by PDF forces on off duty American service members. When Powell asked him what he intended to do, he immediately told Powell he was headed back to his command to get a first hand feel for the situation."⁸¹

"In this same vein, and one that is somewhat in contrast to the two previous examples, is how Thurman liked to give information to his superiors. Keep in mind that Thurman had much better personal strategic transportation systems available than did Palmer and Ridgway. He also had much better communications equipment—he talked to Powell four or five times daily.⁸² He didn't just sit in his headquarters and make use of the communications technology during planning, though. He talked in person to his strategic leaders on several occasions as the planning proceeded. This personal touch, both up and down, was a command technique that technology allowed him to accomplish much more frequently than the other two gentlemen we've discussed."

"Now a real contrast with Korea, and to the Dominican Republic in terms of its scope, was the requirement for strategic deployments by a majority of the forces within a very compressed time period. The operational commander was forced to balance operational security, tactical force requirements, and time phased strategic lift capabilities.

Almost as an aside Max added, "This may be a place where the art and science of operational command mesh."

"...or collide," added Norman under his breath.

"My final contrast to what we've already discussed has to do with post conflict operations," said Max in conclusion. "In Korea, Ridgway was promoted out of the job before he had to deal with them. Shoot, US forces haven't really concluded that conflict yet. In the Dominican Republic, we were anxious to turn the whole thing over to a regional authority.⁸³ After we stopped fighting Just Cause, we took to the task of nation building by ourselves."⁸⁴

When Max leaned back in his chair and took a drink from his coffee mug, all eyes turned to Matthew and his attempt to capture the relevant points of the conversation on his now growing collection of board space.

Panama

- Two operational commanders who shared operational responsibility for a truly joint operation.
- Shared Vision through doing.
- Initially complicated CoC, refined by execution time.
- Attention to the realities of strategic deployments.
- Personal contact and interaction both up and down the chain of command.
- Personal and direct reconnaissance to gain understanding of situations.

When he was finished he asked, "Any comments?"

"I think we need to capture another point about the media," said Thomas. "We've gone from Ridgway trusting a group of seasoned military media correspondents with secret and operationally sensitive information to sharing mutual distrust with a group of militarily naïve correspondents. That's significant in my book."

- Little effort to make commander available to media. Mutual distrust between military and group of militarily inexperienced journalists.

"Agreed," said Matthew as he added another bullet to the base of the board space. "Now let's apply our utility test."

"I don't think we can assess my first bullet as either positive or negative; it's neutral," he explained to the group as much as he thought out loud.

"Bullet two—the one about vision—is clearly a plus

Utility Test of Operational Commander Behavior

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- Attempt to dislocate the enemy?

given our test," added Hugh. "For that matter the clear chain of command bullet is also a plus for the same reason. It's a whole lot easier to communicate the vision if the chain of command works."

"The deployment piece clearly relates to an ability to conduct major operations," offered Max. "In this case it also played a role in sequencing the military actions. Both these qualities match our test; that one should be a plus, too."

"Your last two bullets are fairly similar, John," said Norman. "Those personal contacts and interaction with subordinates facilitates understanding the commander's vision. The same thing with superiors helps endure that the commander understands and/or helps shape strategy; another match with our test for a plus. The personal reconnaissance of which Dave spoke helped Thurman design and organize his major operations. I think that's another plus."

"I think the media characteristic we added at the end is neutral, said Hugh. "I don't think it generates a yes or no response to any of our utility test questions."

Matthew added the group's assessments to the board and waited for comments

or disagreements. When no one provided any, he turned and announced a ten minute break.⁸⁵

When they returned they would proceed to talk about the Mother of all Battles.

Operation Desert Storm

"Unlike Max's contention for multiple personalities under the rubric of operational command," began Norman after all had returned. "I can tell you that in Desert Storm Norman Schwarzkopf was the operational commander. Perhaps had someone with a personality other than that of General Yeosock commanded Third Army, I might be arguing for some shared operational command like we say took place in Panama. Heck, Third Army even did do what some have called campaign planning.⁸⁶ That description is an inexact one, though. Schwarzkopf was 'The Man.'"

"In more ways than one, huh?" added Bruce. "Schwarzkopf took a one half million strong force from a military that had been oriented on operating in theaters in which it was already forward deployed, had standardized agreements with its allies for the prosecution of any conflicts, and in which

Panama

- (O) Two operational commanders who shared operational responsibility for a truly joint operation.
- (+) Shared Vision through doing.
- (+) Initially complicated CoC, refined by execution time.
- (+) Attention to the realities of strategic deployments.
- (+) Personal contact and interaction both up and down the chain of command.
- (+) Personal and direct reconnaissance to gain understanding of situations.
- (O) Little effort to make commander available to media. Mutual distrust between military and group of militarily inexperienced journalists.

there was a robust infrastructure, and deployed it into a rarefied environment using a plan only conceptually validated, fought with a coalition put together on the fly, won a lopsided victory, and redeployed all his forces home to a joyous and thankful citizenry. It would be tough not to be 'The Man' when someone is that successful."

"I don't think you can be that disappointed with the results he achieved—particularly with his ability to keep the coalition together," responded Norman.⁸⁷ "But even with that success, there were a few warts that bear attention."

"The most striking things about Schwarzkopf were probably his experience and his personality," continued Norman. "Both of these aspects really tempered how he commanded. In terms of his experience, you have to remember how much he had learned and worked to learn about Arab culture. His boyhood and military experiences gained him specific insights into how Arabs thought and perceived things.⁸⁸ He thought this understanding and his recent experiences as the Army's DCSOPS gained him great insight into the strategic and political realities of the coalition he essentially headed. Frankly, it contributed to him gaining a bunker mentality when it came to the prosecution of the war."⁸⁹

"Both he and Yeosock, his immediate Army subordinate, were very concerned about coalition relations.⁹⁰ As I said, this clearly had an impact on Schwarzkopf's behavior. He appeared to feel that proximity to Khalid—the Arab coalition commander—was essential to keep the coalition effort on schedule and synchronized both operationally and strategically.⁹¹ The difficulty with this outlook is multi-fold. He retained the functional command of land component forces. His immediate Army subordinate saw himself as commanding essentially a theater army vice a field army. Neither commander nor any of their key staff officers got as far forward as a corps main CP during the entire ground battle. On the one occasion when senior members of Third Army ventured forward in an attempt to gain a personal appreciation of the battlefield, Yeosock recalled them following a tirade by the CINC.⁹² The Army corps commanders lacked any chance to look their superior(s) in the face, speak clearly to them, and receive personal guidance about the extended vision for the operation.⁹³ The absence of a coherent, common understanding should have become apparent when the CINC, after multiple expressions of disappointment about the progress of VII Corps, finally spoke personally to

that corps commander by phone.⁹⁴ The absence of an understanding by Schwarzkopf about what was actually happening on the battlefield was never more apparent than during his 'Mother of all Briefings' when he told the world that 'the gate is closed.' As his corps commanders knew then, and we all know now, that was clearly not the case even days later when, again not having consulted with anyone who had set foot on the battlefield, the CINC chose a site for the cease fire talks still in enemy hands.⁹⁵

"Schwarzkopf's prominent personality traits are pretty well known. This man had a hair trigger. Frankly, his staff—even his Chief of Staff—were intimidated and somewhat frightened of him. He had clearly not empowered them to act in his absence.⁹⁶ By the beginning of 1991, his deputy seemed to be the only person in theater willing or able to confront the CINC.⁹⁷

"Well, despite your earlier comment that there were only 'warts,' we've certainly painted an awfully successful leader as worthless so far," said Bruce. "Can we find anything he did well?"

"Yes, there are things he did well and tried to do well," came Norman's response. "He tried to personally attend a meeting with strategic leaders early in Desert Shield in which they were ostensibly reviewing plans for the defense of Saudi Arabia and a plan for an attack into Kuwait with the one Army corps in theater.⁹⁸ In retrospect that meeting in Washington, to which Schwarzkopf sent his chief of staff, was essentially a oil check of the CINC's inventiveness and vision by his strategic leaders. He complied with the letter of the requirements sent him, but was unable to personally interact with those leaders on this very important topic based on their prohibition against him leaving the theater."

"Schwarzkopf also maintained at least daily communications with Powell by phone. This gave each of them the chance to maintain a holistic and common understanding of the situation.⁹⁹ Given Powell's influence within and understanding of the strategic level chain of command, that was a fruitful way for Schwarzkopf to act."

"There are similarities with the previous examples, too. Desert Storm presented a strategic deployment the scale, intensity, and scope of which may have never been matched.¹⁰⁰ Although the operation nominally had an OPLAN tied to it, the deployment sequence was anything but tightly wired. Many a deployment faux pas came to light, but none that threatened the operation by themselves.¹⁰¹ Schwarzkopf personally adjudicated some key deployment decisions."¹⁰² "Another similarity had to do

with the press. Again, the military tried to manage reporter access to the battlefield. Some reporters took off on their own for the battlefield this time.¹⁰³ It again resulted in disharmony in both directions. Reporters distrustful of military answers kept asking inane questions. Military officers equally distrustful of military neophytes offered only choreographed access to newsworthy events.¹⁰⁴ One positive development was the daily press briefing at CENTCOM Hq. This offered both sides benefit. Fairly senior officers would periodically appear; the CINC did three times. This generated an opportunity for the military to prosecute information campaigns and for the media to directly question key people and gain sound bits for daily newscasts."¹⁰⁵

"Come on, Cal," encouraged Matthew from his place at the board. "Talk about the chain of command. You know we'll ask."

"Not to disappoint," began Norman. "But the chain of command was pretty clear on paper here.¹⁰⁶ The major concerns about it were really the pieces to which I alluded previously. Schwarzkopf acted as the LCC, at least in title. As I said before, you could call into question whether he performed any of the key functions one might expect from such a functional commander. Add to that the problem with Yeosock's perception that he commanded a theater army and not one that directed the two corps in battle, and the fact that he had to relinquish and then reassume command just before the ground war.¹⁰⁷ You can easily see some difficulty. The real concern in my mind here was that we had a multi-service chain of command and not a joint one. In many ways Desert Storm was the successful culmination of four service operations that resulted in a joint victory, not a joint operation itself."¹⁰⁸

"Got all that, John," asked Norman as he pivoted in his chair to look at Matthew's summary of his recitation of the salient points about Desert Storm. "I'll be disappointed in Mary if she doesn't make you add something about continued mutual distrust between the military and the media."

"I had not yet stopped writing, thank you," said Matthew as he quickly added a short modifying phrase to the effect suggested by Norman. "Will that work for you and Mary, my friend? If so, let's continue with our test. You folks know the drill by now."

Matthew again provided everyone with a glimpse of their test of utility.

"Well, I can tell you that Schwarzkopf's handling of the coalition at the operational level was critical to getting an

affirmative response at least the first three questions of our test," said Norman. "I feel certain that he saw that as his center of gravity and he wasn't going to let that fall out of whack."

"I'll agree that the maintenance of the coalition was important, Cal," responded Hugh. "But, the way he did it, as evidenced by the next bullet, meant that his subordinates and he lacked that operational vision and it prevented them from orchestrating military actions to achieve all the strategic

Desert Storm

- Significant effort to maintain coalition coordination and unity of effort.
- No personal contact with subordinates forward during battle. Poor understanding of tactical reality.
- Routine, frequent contact with strategic leaders by phone.
- Infrequent personal contact with the same leaders.
- Precisely identified chain of command which operated in a confusing manner. (LCC role kept by the CINC, Cdr, USARCENT acts as theater army cdr vice field army cdr.)
- CINC appears three times before international media during war. Attempt to make a type of media pool work. Daily briefings at CENTCOM Hq.

- CINC appears three times before international media during war. Attempt to make a type of media pool work. Daily briefings at CENTCOM Hq. **CONTINUED MUTUAL DISTRUST.**

Utility Test of Operational Commander Behavior

Does the commander...

- Design, organize, and conduct campaigns and major operations?
- Sequence military actions and resource them such that they produce military conditions that achieve strategic goals?
- Effectively communicate an operational vision?
- Execute actions that will facilitate freedom of action?
- Attempt to dislocate the enemy?

goals. We should rightly give him a plus for the first bullet, but should clearly give him a minus for the second."

"Our next tow bullets offer the same dichotomy," offered Thomas. "I'd rather not couch them in quite the same terms, though. Schwarzkopf's frequent communications with strategic leaders generated the same benefits of which we've previously spoken; that gets a plus. His inability to have personal contacts with them results in a minus sign using the same rationale. This wasn't Schwarzkopf's fault, though. Others occasionally restricted his ability to interact in person with his strategic leaders."

"The confusing operation of the chain of command is the antithesis of what we discussed for Just Cause," said Max. "Given that, it should get a minus sign using the same logic we did there."

"By the same token," he continued. "I think the media piece we've got in our last bullet is neutral. Again, this is the same logic we used for Just Cause; I won't restate it."

"OK, people," concluded Matthew. "Unless I hear an

objection we will continue with Mark's operation in Africa."

Desert Storm

- (+) Significant effort to maintain coalition coordination and unity of effort.
- (-) No personal contact with subordinates forward during battle. Poor understanding of tactical reality.
- (+) Routine, frequent contact with strategic leaders by phone.
- (-) Infrequent personal contact with the same leaders.
- (-) Precisely identified chain of command which operated in a confusing manner.
- (0) CINC appears three times before international media during war. Attempt to make a type of media pool work. Daily briefings at CENTCOM Hq. **CONTINUED MUTUAL DISTRUST.**

Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II

"Frankly, I'm not sure we will want to study the practice of operational command in my example," began Thomas in a rather sober manner. He paused to let that statement sink in before continuing.

"I think my story is about two operations. The first fails to qualify as a 'conflict' as we initially agreed to for a screening criteria. I think the second offers us no operational commander to study. I offer a quick overview of each and then we'll see if you folks agree."

"Restore Hope was a joint operation conducted on fairly short notice. LTG Johnston, the commander of I MEF was clearly the operational commander who reported to another Marine at CENTCOM, GEN Hoar.¹⁰⁹ The deployment was rapid and somewhat confused.¹¹⁰ The predeployment chain of command was very convoluted.¹¹¹ There were some combat operations that frequently were the result of decisions to respond to acts of force perpetrated against US forces.¹¹² The key point here is that the initial forces deploying to Somalia clearly saw their mission as a humanitarian relief operation, though one in which someone might resist their efforts to hand out MREs and build bridges.¹¹³ The forces may have been there under the provisions of UN chapter seven and not six, but they weren't there to fight.¹¹⁴ When it was over, everyone seemed pretty pleased with how Restore Hope turned out based on the number of injuries we saw from people spraining their arms patting themselves on the back."

"The second operation was UNOSOM II. The transition from Restore Hope to UNOSOM II happened very quickly.¹¹⁵ It happened too quickly for the US forces commander to spend more than a few days preparing.¹¹⁶ For domestic and international political reasons an American was not placed in overall command of this second phase of the humanitarian relief effort. He was dual hatted as the deputy UN commander, though.¹¹⁷ In this role he answered to a myriad of masters in the US chain of command and the UN chain of command. With a staff really too small to direct operations, he was in a tight spot."¹¹⁸

"We were all worried that you might not address chain of command issues, Mark," said a sarcastic Norman. "It seems that issue raises its head in each vignette."

"And so it does here, too, my friends," continued Thomas. "As clear as the operational chain was for Restore Hope, it was that confused for UNOSOM II. Without even considering the national command chains that permeate any UN operation, the US forces chain of command was hopelessly convoluted. This was particularly true when Task Force Ranger appeared on the scene. Here was a force of American soldiers perhaps conducting the most dynamic and explosive pieces of the operation *and they weren't under the command of the US forces commander.*¹¹⁹ As I mentioned earlier, this presented the US forces with perhaps one of the most significant difficulties during the UNOSOM II

phase of the operation— there was *no one* performing as the operational commander. The capabilities of the US forces commander and the lack of unity of command simply prevented him from doing so. It certainly wasn't the Task Force Ranger commander, MG Garrison. His focus was clearly tactical. For example, he characterized the famed Mogadishu raid on 3 October as a success.¹²⁰ The strategic leadership of the US clearly found that the particular operation to be an abject failure.¹²¹ Operational commanders don't view strategic failures as good things. It wasn't General Hoar, the CINC. He was too removed from the now UN operation. I don't think we want to say that the Turkish general in command of the UN operation was the US operational commander, either. More evidence of the lack of an operational commander may be found in who was establishing strategic policy guidance. It was the UN secretary general, not our nation's strategic leaders who pushed for the offensive against Aidid. This UN to US policy mismatch contributed to generating a command chain without someone minding the operational store."¹²²

Thomas cleared his throat before offering a short closing.

"Absent our ability to identify an operational commander for UNOSOM II and with the understanding that Restore Hope really didn't match the 'conflict' screening criteria we set out in the beginning, I don't really have anything else to add."

"I can think of one thing—operational commander or not—about this incident that bears on our search," said Bruce. "Here was the case of a small tactical action having tremendous strategic significance. The thing I find interesting is that if it had been successful, it would have had little or no strategic impact. Its failure produced strategic shock waves. That's a new and startling development that has great operational significance."

"I don't agree with you one hundred percent, Carl," interjected Hugh. "Many people seem to be saying that now that tactical events have such an impact on strategic concerns that the 'landscape' of operational command has changed. This raid in Mogadishu and the so called 'Highway of Death' in Kuwait are forwarded as examples of this.¹²³ I think it's always been that way. Think about the cavalry regiments guarding the border in Germany before the wall came down or how the minor actions of Captain Bonifas during the tree cutting incident in the Korean JSA influenced or could have influenced

things on a strategic level.¹²⁴ All we have today is greater information velocity and access. People know about tactical results more quickly and across a wider spectrum than before. That's the reason that failure seems to have such an impact; it's transmitted farther and faster than success ever is."

When no one spoke again for a few instants, all the participants turned again in Pavlovian style to Matthew's board. He, too, spoke not a

Somalia

- No operational commander.
- Very confused and complex chain of command.
- Velocity and scope of newsworthy information means tactical failure can have great strategic impact.

word. Everyone seemed to understand that without a conflict or operational commander to analyze that he couldn't assess his few points with respect to commander positioning against their Utility Test. When silence seemed to indicate consent with his summary, he took his seat.

A Question of Scope

The silence lasted only a contemplative moment before Hugh challenged the scope of the group's investigation thus far.

"It just occurred to me that other nations have some experience with operational command. Why not also consider their examples,... or even other professions' leadership practices? The Israelis fought some modern battles fairly recently using some Western equipment and opposing Soviet equipment and tactics. The Soviets fought in Afghanistan fairly recently against an asymmetrical enemy. The British and Argentine fighting in the South Atlantic also seems to provide possible insights. Similarly, I think we could easily stratify large corporate actions into those that parallel our strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Why not consider their practices, too?"

"I thought about that, too, Mary," said Thomas. "But, frankly, I think it makes no sense to compare apples and oranges in this realm; and that's what we'd be doing. While we may gain tactical insights from conflicts involving other nations, it's hard to compare operational command because the nations themselves are so very different.¹²⁵ Even our closest allies have strategic goals, structures, and procedures vastly different from our own.¹²⁶ Think about that. If operational commanders are that

link between the similarity we'd find at the tactical level and the vast dissimilarity we'd find strategically, it's hard to say that we'd find many transferable insights at the operational level. Think for a moment about operational command in the Israeli military. In 1973 in their largest theater, in a fight that they thought might border on national survival, the operational commander had essentially about three division equivalents fighting for him.¹²⁷ The strategists, and therefore the operational artists, didn't have to concern themselves with security concerns on the other side of the globe, either. Just those aspects of that fight offer some pretty darn big contrasts to any US conflict."

Hugh gave a nod of concurrence. Bruce then stepped in where Thomas had left off.

"I would argue against the business case, too," he said. "It's not that we can't gain leadership insights from business theory, but I would find it hard to gain insights about operational command from them. We could easily identify the top level of strategists and the bottom level of tacticians in business, but I'm certain that finding our operational level in the middle would be groping in the dark. If you think our answer to the question about what echelon is at the operational level was fuzzy, think about where we'd be if talking about Ford or Federal Express. Another reason I'm leery about using business here is that we're talking about positioning in battle. The civilian world is distinct from the military world when we talk of battle.¹²⁸ Excepting employment with law enforcement or some type of other emergency service, corporate management rarely exposes themselves to bodily harm in the course of their work; they direct their subordinates there infrequently, too."

"OK, I'll give," said Hugh. "Just want to challenge our assumptions enough that we don't all hop on the bus full of illogical deductions."

"And we appreciate those intellectual challenges, Mary," responded Norman with obvious glee. "Just don't make too many of them when we get closer to chow time."

Summary Discussion

"Unless there are any other challenges to our methodology," began Matthew. "We need to convert these observations about the commanders in these vignettes into a historical model. I need you each to consider from where this group exercised command. Anyone find any common threads?"

"Before we go too far down the road of merely looking at common threads let me give you an observation," came Thomas' reply. "As we alluded to previously, there seems to be a dichotomy: planning and executing. There may be common characteristics about command in each of these 'phases,' but I think it's important to recognize the two."¹²⁹

"OK," mumbled Matthew, already deep into his self appointed recording duties.

"Personal contact and interaction seemed to be one clear key to success," offered Hugh. "In the case of each successful commander that was obviously present."

"That's true, Mary," came the response from Max. "Though it wasn't just at the front. Moving around in the sector or zone gained the commander insights into support and logistics, too."

"And I think the genesis of that contact was the commander moving," added Hugh to her earlier statement. "Not the subordinates moving back to him."

"The commanders really didn't just wander around, either," came Norman's thoughts. "They were looking at or for something significant to their scheme. In the process of doing that, they were able to observe and interact with many others, but they had formulated a plan that told them where they needed to impose their will and/or encourage their subordinates."¹³⁰

"A related point to all this has to do with who observes the commanders," said Thomas. "Ridgway obviously felt that his aura was an important addition; that the warrior spirit he imparted was beneficial."

"I think you're right about Ridgway on that point Mark," was Matthew's reply to Thomas. "But I don't know that *he* felt that way. I do know that his aura was very important; vital; cathartic."¹³¹ He wouldn't have been able to impart that across an army without moving around to see fighters and supporters."

"I'm not sure how we fit this in in terms of from where one exercises command," stated Bruce. "But having a clear chain of command seemed to be awfully important,...and something largely missing from most of our discussion."

"For my money, that goes back to my first point," replied Thomas. "Planning is important and we need to distinguish that from execution. Under this topical umbrella, I think a commander has to,

shall we say 'stage' combat, from a central point—likely his main headquarters with its increased communications facilities and densities of planners and LNOs. In the cases we studied in which a clear and functional chain of command was in place for execution it seemed that the operational commander made that chain come true; his presence at the planning meeting or contact with those who would decide the chain resulted in a clean setup. Therefore that commander needs to ensure that during planning he or she is talking regularly with the strategic leaders, both political and military. As someone mentioned earlier, we can't always give operational commanders a position with respect to the ground that will provide the most effective opportunity to exercise command. Sometimes we will only be able to give that commander a location with respect to some function."

"That discussion with the strategic leaders isn't just during planning, Mark, though I agree it's very important then," said Hugh. "It's also important during execution. Everyone's hungry for details about how the fight is going. Now, and certainly in the future, we've got real time communications established from the strategic leaders into theater. Unless the operational commander is quenching the strategic leaders' appetites for information, they will bother the tactical fighters; remove their attention from the fight by demanding information. It seems to me that the good operational commanders 'shielded' the fighters from that pressure."

"I don't mean to have us backtrack, here," said Norman almost apologetically. "But, I want to add an observation in the planning versus execution area. I don't know if we want to count deployments as part of planning or execution, but it appears clear to me from the last few vignettes we talked about that that was tremendously important to the operational commander's ability to prosecute the campaign. Now I think that going to an APOE or SPOD may be a good occasional activity for an operational commander, but I don't think that allowed them to track that deployment per se. I think that information was available in one of their command posts in the detail and with the trends required to understand how that deployment is effecting that commander's capabilities."

A few moments without any bursts of free association thought confronted the panel. In addition to this being a somewhat rare event, it cued Matthew that they might be near the end of this portion of their journey.

"Anyone else want to add something?" he asked.

Only silence greeted him.

"Well, I have one thought," he announced in slow and deliberate speech. "This point may have been best exhibited by my old boss, but it certainly fits into a historical model of effective operational command. I also think it fits into a model describing from where one exercises that command because the concept is central to one's freedom to exercise that command from a myriad of locations."

"Well, for God's sake, John, tell us!" blurted Norman. "Stop setting it up and tell us."

"We *do* want a break, don't we, Cal?" said Matthew, evidently a bit pleased with himself that he'd been able to draw a reaction from his friend. "I think Ridgway always—and some of these other operational commanders sometimes—exercised *command* through their deputies or chief of staff. He talked about the 'dual personality of a commander and (his) chief of staff.' He said that they had such a degree of 'mutual confidence' that they were essentially 'one person.' He found it essential that they each knew 'what the other was thinking.'¹³² What I talk about here doesn't identify a location for exercise of command, but is rather a requirement for an operational commander if he or she wishes to be free to exercise dynamic instead of static command."

"John, it is a good point," said Norman in a mockingly lugubrious voice. "Can we please summarize now?"

Matthew, who had been laboring at the board during most of the preceding conversation already had most of his work there finished. He scribbled a bit more after Norman's last comment and said, "OK, I think I've got the salient points of our discussion reduced to writing. Please take a look and see if we can agree to this as our historical model."

Historical Model

Where in theater have US Forces operational commanders exercised command during a campaign or operation?

- "Stage" combat from a main headquarters before combat and during lulls. Track deployments carefully.
- Move **forward** to canvas, assess, coordinate, and interact. Observe rear operations, too.
- Personally observe key actions which will impact on the operational commander's future scheme.
- Allow fighters to observe the operational commander's battlefield presence.
- Exercise **command** through deputies and the chief of staff. Delegate them significant authority and access. Position one or more of these agents at a known location almost always physically accessible and always virtually accessible.
- Communicate routinely to strategic leaders your thoughts, perceptions, and general plans. Interact personally when possible. Shield the fighters to fight.

Ways to Fail:

- *Make subordinates come *back* to your headquarters.
- *Don't talk to forward positioned *fighters*
- *Centralize: Allow no trusted agents to speak for you in your absence.
- *Create a confused command structure

"John, that looks good to me,...and I'm the one always raising the objections," said Hugh after several minutes of thoughtful silence by the panel's participants.

"I need another break," said Norman.

"Ten minutes," replied Matthew. "In ten minutes be back to talk about the future."

Chapter 4

Environmental Changes Through 2010

"We'll have twelve more years of history that will affect our model by the year 2010," began Matthew. "If we want this model to make sense then, we need to quantify the significant changes to the environment that will take place during that time."

"Well, John, I'm not sure we need to go quite that far," answered Hugh. "We really only need to capture those changes that have a direct impact on our model. That's a smaller set of changes, you know."

"I think there are two sets of changes with which we need to concern ourselves," said Thomas. "Technological changes will impact on the equipment and systems we use to fight conflicts; that's one set. The second set of changes has to do with the environment. Who participates in a conflict? Who directs the parties in a conflict? What are the reasons for parties to enter a conflict?"

"I agree with Mark, folks," said Matthew while again scribbling on a nearby board to keep track of the agenda. "But I think we need to focus most of our efforts into describing the changes in technology as they effect information systems. I think we can all agree right now that weapons lethality will increase and our battlefield will continue to empty.¹³³ If we're not careful we can get wrapped up trying to figure out how weapons systems will change, but unless those modifications revolutionize battle in the next twelve years, its not really germane to our hunt for how one should exercise operational command."

"Good point, John," responded Thomas. "I agree."

"Well, folks, I'll dive right in," said a never shy Norman to the group. "One of the things that will clearly change in the next twelve years is information technology. The operational commander will have at his or her disposal tremendous ability to see friendly forces, enemy forces, and the terrain.¹³⁴ That friendly force 'picture' will be a two way street, too. It will be easy for a commander to conduct virtual conversations over an intranet both with his subordinates and his superiors.¹³⁵

"The commander may have the systems that allow him or her to see those things," retorted Hugh. "but whether that information reflects the truth is really another question."

"What do you mean, Mary?" asked Norman.

"I will agree that the US Army will have a staggering array of systems that provide an unprecedented scope and scale of data.¹³⁶ But to assume that that data represents the truth might be a leap of faith; lot's of folks have proven the ability to scramble or forge our information, and the Russians showed they were able to disable one of our satellites several years ago."¹³⁷

"I'm still slow on the uptake, Mary," confessed Bruce. "What are you saying?"

"I'm saying that US Army Forces have access to a plethora of information, and not all of it will be accurate. Most of our systems are constructed to gather data, not really confirm it.¹³⁸ Sure, we encrypt information going in and coming out, but we leave confirmation to the humans, by and large. One of two things will happen. We will grow dependent on the information the machines gather and trust its veracity, opening ourselves to virtual deception, or we will grow suspicious of all the data and trust very little of the systems that are supposed to provide us with such an advantage over our foes."

"Another concern about leveraging information technology has to do with our ability to share with the entire force with whom we're fighting," added Max. "Some of our sister services' equipment speaks different languages right now.¹³⁹ That may well be solved in short order, but some of the services don't think they can field a digitized force—they just don't have the money.¹⁴⁰ In addition, coalition warfare—the direction that US Army doctrine insists we're headed—produces some strange bedfellows. Imagine two years before ODS thinking about having Syria as a war time ally. We may be able to make this work in the short run with some of the larger NATO countries' armies, but we aren't going to be able to make this work across all our coalitions.¹⁴¹

"So, we should just throw all that capability out the window?" asked Norman with a good measure of his regular sarcasm.

"No, not at all," countered Max. "We just can't assume it's a panacea. It'll be information, not necessarily the truth.

"We're getting off track some here," warned Matthew. "This is not a debate about what should be done so much as what we think will be done; what will be available. So far we've agreed on significant information collection and transmission capabilities. Essentially, we're saying non hierarchical information carousels with virtually limitless pull-down capability will become a reality.¹⁴² We are, however, skeptical about the ability of the systems now to validate the credibility of all the information. Speak now if that doesn't satisfy everyone."

"You know technological change is not the only thing an operational commander need concern himself," said Bruce, not really waiting for anyone to challenge Matthew's last statement. "The nature of conflict itself will change."

"True, said Hugh. "The entities with whom we find ourselves fighting may very well not be nation-states. Drug cartels, cultures whose membership crosses international boundaries, criminal organizations, terrorist groups, and several other entities are plausible enemies.¹⁴³ Even with the limited wars we've fought we almost always understood who the enemy was; we could post a picture of the leader(s) and knew how to contact them even if it meant going through a third party."

"Right, Mary," said Bruce to his apparent tag team partner. "That impact will be particularly felt at the strategic level. We've been a nation that always seemed to embrace Clausewitz's concept that war was an extension of policy.¹⁴⁴ It will be particularly difficult for us to operate in an environment that will essentially violate our logical construct of why nation-states participate in war."¹⁴⁵

Matthew headed back to his board and began writing again as a momentary silence greeted the end of Bruce's statement. Before Matthew finished writing, Thomas broke the silence.

"John you mentioned earlier that battlefield lethality will increase markedly resulting in greater dispersion," he said. "I agree with that. Let's not understate the impact on operational command of that increased battlefield dispersion."¹⁴⁶

"I'd say it will increase fluidity," interjected Norman. "Dispersion sounds like one needs more space, but I think the requirement results from a necessity to thwart detection and prevent effective engagement. That may not require any more area, per se, but will require formations not to be static."

"I'll agree with that logic," continued Thomas. "This characteristic of battle will greatly stress our logistics system. We will become a transportation based logistical military, instead of inventory based."¹⁴⁷

"Quite frankly, tactical dispersion, or fluidity as Cal puts it, to counter precision weapons will make it tougher for a commander to visit units and command posts," added Thomas. "Now, all our technology may make it simple to keep track of where someone or something is or will be, but it's still less complex to go to a static location than to find a dynamic one."¹⁴⁸

Sensing no one else ready to leap into the fray at that moment, Matthew turned from his board and said, "I've essentially got four major environmental changes recorded here. See if you agree."

Relevant Environmental Changes

- Diversity of potential foes. Non-nation-states will emerge as threats causing strategic uncertainty.
- Lethality increases will require increased dispersion or fluidity.
- Logistical systems significantly more stressed than at present. Transition from inventory based systems to transportation based systems.
- Availability of vast of non-hierarchical information carousels that could facilitate situational awareness if perception of information validity is realized.

"OK, troops," Matthew said after a several second pause. "On to the modification of our historical model with the future in mind."

Chapter 5

How Should We Do This in the Future?

"Frankly, my friends, this explosion of access to real time information should have multiple consequences," observed Bruce soon after Matthew indicated the topic change. "On one hand the speed with which the media can cover a story and their ability to cover stories world wide will continue to increase.¹⁴⁹ But, we're on to something when we talk about the veracity and credibility of information. With the media racing to get the story out first and 'scoop' their competition it's easy to see that mistakes will occur. The public will become as skeptical as the experienced sergeant working in the command post—they won't ever believe the first report. This won't spell the end of operational security, but may assist it.¹⁵⁰ Simply put, operational commanders don't need to behave all that differently with respect to the press than they have in the past simply because of these technological improvements. They've no need to become obsessed with the media; the decision makers—not the media—will still make the decisions."¹⁵¹

"Secondly, the continued advances in communications technology should make it easier for commanders to journey from their command posts, not cement them to those posts.¹⁵² We may see a re-birth of the idea that personal interaction and presence gives the commander the opportunity to best measure the reactions and attitudes of his commanders, get the best possible picture, and exercise the full authority of his command."¹⁵³

"Greater information access should assist commanders as they plan their actions away from their command posts," said Matthew.¹⁵⁴ "Commanders should be able to better comprehend where their presence is needed on the battlefield to encourage their subordinates and supervising the operational fight at the point of decision.¹⁵⁵ In addition, these new systems will give the commander greater ability to virtually visit the less dynamic locations on the battlefield. The commander can maintain contact with a larger portion of his force while focusing his personal presence where it will do the most good."¹⁵⁶

"Information technologies should make a great command information tool, too," added Hugh. "A commander could emphasize his trips forward, his exposure to the jeopardy of the battlefield. He could also reinforce critical information, perhaps those tactical actions that could have direct and immediate strategic effects. We make a big deal of unit newspapers when forces deploy now.¹⁵⁷ Imagine the effect of TV. This point may not seem to relate to commander positioning per se, but this technological capability really facilitates commander trips away from the CP to conduct personal visits."

"Most of this will also reinforce another dynamic that is present to a certain extent now," said Norman again changing the direction of the conversation. "In World War II Eisenhower decided when to launch the D Day invasion. Instantaneous communications will likely prevent an operational commander from having the authority to make a decision of that magnitude alone again.¹⁵⁸ Operational commanders will see a centralization of decisions because they have strategic impact. To counter the potential paralyzing effect of this, that commander will have to maintain continuous and significant interface with his strategic leaders."

"That will be particularly true based on our assessment that non-nation-state enemies will tend to confuse our conventional strategic, diplomatic operations," added Matthew while nodding to himself.

There was a pause in the conversation. It seemed that everyone had been waiting for their chance to talk about how to change the model to account for future environmental shifts and when that time came they all blurted out their thoughts. A pensive silence fell on the panel for several moments. Max finally spoke.

"I'm not sure if we missed this when we talked about environmental changes or whether we assumed this was simply a current condition that would continue," he began. "It appears that coalition warfare is the way of the future.¹⁵⁹ The stresses of coalition warfare are already significant. Add in the increased stresses that our allies will feel—like us—when addressing non-nation-state enemies and you see that operational commanders will need to focus on coalition maintenance. Perhaps this effort will require greater effort than before for these reasons."

"I don't know if we forgot your point about coalitions or assumed it as a current condition," said Matthew, again busily scribbling at the board. "Your statement is valid, nonetheless."

Matthew wrote like a wild man without comment for quite a while, or so it seemed to the rest of the silent panel anxious to see his handiwork.

"There!" he finally announced as he spun the board around. "Objections to the modifications I made to our historical model to turn it into a future model?"

Future Model

From where in theater should the circa 2010 US Forces operational commander exercise command during a campaign or operation?

- "Stage" combat from a main headquarters before combat and during lulls. Track deployments carefully.
- *Selectively* move forward to canvas, assess, coordinate, and interact. Observe rear operations, too. *Use virtual capabilities to appreciate less vital quantities and communicate with more independent subordinates.*
- Personally observe key actions which will impact on the operational commander's future scheme. *These events may involve coalition activities far from the fighting.*
- Allow fighters to observe the operational commander's battlefield presence. *Use command information systems to show all troops when the commander does so.*
- Exercise command through trusted agents with significant delegated authority and access. Position one or more of these agents at a known location almost always physically accessible and always virtually accessible.
- Communicate routinely to strategic leaders your thoughts, perceptions, and general plans. Interact personally when possible. Shield the fighters to fight.
- *Demand that communications systems reach forward to allow the operational commander to be forward and "talk" to superiors.*

After each of the panel members finished reading their eyes unintentionally all swung toward Mary Hugh. She took note of this attention and took noticeable pleasure in keeping the others in suspense.

Finally, she simply said, "John, I have no recommended changes."

The relief in the room was palpable.

"I would like to draw your attention to one thing before we adjourn, my friends," said Matthew. "It seems that our initial assumptions weren't all correct. If you recall we began this search with the idea that we would have to define 'the battlefield.' You'll note that we all seem satisfied with this result and have not argued again about that definition."

Thomas' offered a succinct reply.

"Maybe that proves that it's fairly easy to be wrong about what will be important in the future if one clings to comfortable paradigms."

Chapter 6

Summary

With the exchange of a few pleasantries, the panel members slowly cleared the stage. All that remained after they had left were the ideas they had discussed and the few physical manifestations of these ideas: the tables, graphs, and drawings occupying some space on the stage. What they left behind was still important and insightful, though, if those who had witnessed the discussion and debate cared to use it in their future endeavors.

The panel members discovered several important things about operational command and from where the commander should exercise his or her command in the future.

- First, they found that operational commanders still have to go look, talk, listen, and see. It is as important when they do this that they are “seen” as that they “see.” Those who didn’t personally go to critical spots were blinded to the realities of the battlefield, even if they had the best of communications and information systems at their disposal. This poor situational acuity led them to concur with flawed strategic decisions. The absence of personal contact with tactical subordinates may have led to a disaffection and reduced loyalty that contributed to the operational commander’s poor understanding of reality. The future will likely hold the same rewards and punishments.
- Second, they discovered that a commander could effectively exercise command (not just control) through selected trusted agents who shared the commander’s outlook and conceptual framework of conflict. If one or more trusted agents were always available, operational commanders lost little when they availed themselves of the opportunity (albeit with reduced communications availability) to move to critical spots on the battlefield. Periodic sessions with the trusted agents were required to build a mutual trust and common vision. Again, the future will require the same type of arrangement to function in a highly fluid environment.
- Third, they determined that advances in communications and information systems technology can facilitate a commander’s frequent movement away from a command post instead of tying the commander to the CP. Advances in technology will allow more selective itineraries for trips around their command. Some static qualities of the situation (terrain, stockage levels, rates of flow, etc.)

are readily understood with advanced information systems and should free the commander to personally visit other critical spots. Trusted and capable subordinates with whom the commander feels certain he or she shares a common vision may require only virtual visits, thereby freeing the commander to personally visit other, more critical, spots.

- Fourth, they decided that it's important for an operational commander to plan personal or virtual contacts with strategic and coalition decision makers at critical times. A failure to do so can result in uninformed decisions by strategic or coalition decision makers that are difficult or impossible to reverse or result in paralysis by strategic centralization of decisions. Doing this will also tend to shield subordinate tactical warfighters to fight.
- Fifth, commanders must still take the time to appreciate the situation and communicate with a myriad of disparate people as he or she plans future operations. This will likely still be done from a command post with a concentration of staff officers and enhanced communications and information systems.
- Sixth, both system and personal credibility will be a valuable commodity in the future world with a myriad of sometimes conflicting information.

The panel members had divined all this. At its core was an appreciation that operational commanders, much like all leaders, must do two basic things to succeed: understand and influence.

An operational commander practicing the operational art must understand in holistic depth and influence both strategists and tacticians. A static demeanor, outlook, position, or interest will normally fail.

Endnotes

¹ Schneider, Jim, Vulcan's Anvil, (SAMS Theoretical Paper # 4, 1991); pg 42; Epstein, Robert, AMSP 97-98 Seminar 1 class discussion.

² Columbia Pictures, "Braveheart," produced by Mel Gibson and Alan Ladd, Jr., written by Randall Wallace, 1995.

³ Keegan, John, A History of Warfare, (New York: Viking Press, 1982), pg 246-249, explains the ancient Greeks' being enthralled with competitions put on by their leaders that resembled marshal events or were initiated to celebrate some marshal event. Winners of these events were over-rewarded, to a certain extent to compel or encourage men to fight. Within several hundred years, even this type of glorification of warrior spirit failed to inure warriors to the horrors of combat—they needed leaders present at the battle to motivate them. Grant, Michael, The Fall of the Roman Empire, (New York: Collier Books, 1990), pg 31-33 discusses the dynamic that developed in Rome around the fourth century A.D. in which powerful generals would engineer a *coup d'état* in order to rise to the throne. Strategic leaders generally succeeded in long reigns if they were militarily successful, and could ensure fewer powerful subordinates capable of a coup if they led their armies in battle.

⁴ Keegan, pg 254 highlights the idea that in ancient times (in this case the Athenians around 500 B.C.) if one sent its army to a certain location its homeland was now undefended. A battlefield loss either at that remote location or defending one's home brought catastrophe.

⁵ This acceptance was popular, but by no means universal. One could argue that as late as the early 1990s nations like Iraq had yet to "discover" the operational level of war and several other qualities of great benefit to an army.

⁶ FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993) pg 2-2 ; CGSOC 96-97, Term III, Department of Joint and Combined Operations course A734 "Joint Forces Command," class discussion; Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero, (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), pg 373-374.

⁷ Field Marshal Foch was an influential French General who shaped both French doctrine prior to WW I and fought therein.

⁸ Smith was Eisenhower's chief of staff, Hanson was Bradley's aide, and Maddox was Patton's G3.

⁹ The panel members are clearly based on some real characters. Matthew's biographical notes closely parallel those of LTC Don Faith and Cal Norman's of LTG Calvin Waller. The remaining characters are also loosely related to actual persons, but as these people are still living and the characters are not directly based on these living persons, the author chooses not to reveal the individuals on whom the characters are based. All this aside, the reader should keep in mind that the author attributes thoughts and arguments to these characters that emanate from many sources, not simply the recorded statements of anyone on whom the character is partially based. These are fictional characters who generally advocate practices and relate experiences associated with the time of their military service. As a memory hook for the reader the characters' last names match the first names of either the principal they represent or one of the prominent senior US commanders in that conflict. (John Matthew and Cal Norman clearly correspond to Matthew Ridgway and Norman Schwarzkopf respectively. Carl

Bruce corresponds to Bruce Palmer in the Dominican Republic Crisis, David Max to Maxwell Thurman in Operation Just Cause, Mark Thomas to Thomas Montgomery in Somalia/UNOSOM II, and Mary Hugh to Henry Shelton in Haiti.)

¹⁰ Matthew refers to Moltke the Elder before the turn of the 20th Century, Moltke the Younger in WW I, and Henry Shelton as the XVIII Corps and JTF commander during the US intervention in Haiti in the middle 1990s.

¹¹ Bruce's thinly veiled sarcasm represents the author's assessment.

¹² Matthew's statements reflect the author's synthesis and appreciation of Ridgway, Matthew, Soldier, (New York: Harper and Borthers, 1956), Ridgway, Matthew, The Korean War, (New York: De Capo Press, 1967), and a tape recording from the CARL archives of his address to the 1966 CSSC class in Eisenhower Hall.

¹³ Thomas synthesizes Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary: APPROVED TERMINOLOGY, (Washington, DC: DoD, 23 March 1994, Updated thru April 1997). Page 388, *operational level of war--(DOD)* The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.

¹⁴ This statement of Thomas' does not find its clarity from our joint doctrine. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, 10 January 1995 Pg 41-42, defines the nature of a campaign, and implies that operational commanders plan and execute the same. In so doing it narrows the field of those who could qualify to joint commanders. This reference does not specifically define what those operational levels are in terms of commands or rank of commander. The reader should also note that JP 1-02 on page 509, also defines the *strategic level of war--(DOD)* "The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans." JP 1-02, pg 527, does little to help us find the "low end" of the operational level as it defines the *tactical level of war--(DOD)* "The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives."

¹⁵ Bruce's question finds backing in JP 1-02, pg 83 where it defines *campaign planning* as--(DOD) "The process whereby combatant commanders and *subordinate joint force commanders* translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available

resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation." (emphasis added)

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Max's descriptions of the levels of war comes from the definitions contained in JP 1-02. He presents condensed versions of the doctrinal definitions here.

¹⁸ Various pieces of joint doctrine refer to "Theater Strategy." JP 1-02 does not list a "Theater Strategic Level of War" but does list definitions for tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. This arrangement prevents the necessity of the author showing that "Theater Strategy" is an oxymoron.

¹⁹ Gawrich, Dr. William conversation with author, 16 Mar 98.

²⁰ Schneider, James, pg 38-64 provides the genesis of most of these characteristics. Norman modifies Schneider's requirement for a "distributed enemy" and for "instantaneous C²," however. In its place Norman offers that an enemy must be active, dynamic, and responsive. In Norman's view, a symmetrical and operationally minded enemy (components of Schneider's description of what makes up a distributed enemy) is not a prerequisite to the practice of operational art. For example, Pemberton's army was dissimilar to Grant's during the Vicksburg campaign in many ways. This asymmetry was *exactly* one of the reasons for Grant's success. (Some may argue that the Vicksburg campaign was not an example of operational art. In Vulcan's Anvil, Schneider points to April 1864—well after Vicksburg—as the birth of the operational art's practice.) In Schneider's defense he states that the presence of a distributed enemy provides the opportunity for the "fullest expression" of the operational art. In other words, the absence of a distributed enemy in his paradigm does not preclude practice of the operational art, it simply limits the practice. Conversation with Shultz, Greg with author, 24 Apr 97 causes Norman to modify "instantaneous C²" to "relative real time C²." It's hard for Norman to accept that the telegraph provided Grant with truly "instantaneous" C²—particularly if viewed from today's standard of speed. That comparison, however, is not important. Instead the telegraph provided Grant with a C² system (albeit focused more on control than command) that operated inside the enemy's OODA loop cycle. This ability of that C² system to operate at a speed relative to the real time decision and execution cycle of his enemy is the tempo or speed standard to which one must refer, not whether or not it is "instantaneous." The author provides the last bullet under the rubric of operational function: attempts to dislocate the enemy. "Dislocation" roughly translates to efforts to temporarily render irrelevant various of the enemy's capabilities thereby gaining a time perishable combat power (+) (firepower, leadership, maneuver, protection, morale) advantage for the dislocating force.

²¹ Corps and larger formations are capable of performing as outlined in Norman's slide under the caption of Operational Level.

²² Collins, J. Lawton, "Leadership at Higher Echelons", Military Review, May 90, pg 33. Collins relates that there is not "any difference in leadership in the smaller units from the leadership required to command large units." The author acknowledges that "command" is distinct from "leadership," while Collins' almost uses the terms synonymously. The author uses this quote to illustrate the idea that unless a commander is doing something different—performing some different function—that

distinctions in command of different sized units (or units in differing levels of war) is a function of the difference in scope, not distinct in any other way.

²³ Swain, Richard, Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the US Army, (SAMS), pg 40-41.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ The reader may be surprised to find Matthew advancing Ridgway, the Eighth Army commander, as the operational commander vice MacArthur, the theater commander. Given the definition the group endorsed for the operational function, (Employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations, through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.) the operational commander *must be attempting to attain strategic goals*. Quite simply, by the time Ridgway assumed command of his army, MacArthur had long since stopped pursuing the nation's strategic goals and had begun pursuing his own. Ridgway, having just come from the Army's DCSOPS position, was intimately aware of the nation's strategic goals and the fact that MacArthur had stopped pursuing them. Ridgway was the operational commander on the Korean peninsula. See generally Perry, Mark, Four Stars, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), pg 25-35 for a summary of the facts surrounding this contention.

²⁶ Ridgway, Soldiers, pg 199-201. Ridgway talks about his clear understanding of the situation in Korea given his posting as the Army DCSOPS. Paret, Goeffrey, Old Soldiers Never Die, (Holbrook, MA: Admas Media Corp, 1997), pg 564-565, indicates that MacArthur had already selected Ridgway as a potential replacement for Walker if something should happen to the 8th Army commander. Perry, pg 31-33 suggests that Ridgway's selection was less MacArthur's doing than the JCS seeking to install MacArthur's eventual successor in the job.

²⁷ Ridgway Soldiers, pg 201. Ridgway intimates that MacArthur gave him great flexibility right from the start. During his initial meeting with MacArthur, Ridgway asked if he was free to attack should he find the situation allowed such action. MacArthur responded by saying, "Matt, the Eighth Army is yours. Do with it as you see fit." Later, Ridgway was able to get command of the third corps on the Korean peninsula, X Corps, something that Walker had never been able to get from MacArthur.

²⁸ Ridgway address to CGSC. See also Patton, George, S., Jr., War as I Knew It, (New York: Bantam Books, 1947), pg 336 for further advocacy of going *forward* to visit one's subordinates.

²⁹ Ridgway, The Korean War, the picture opposite the title page shows a standard picture of the general. Ridgway publicly downplayed the theater associated with a senior general wearing a grenade. On page he says that this essentially simply belies his soldierly nature. He knew that a grenade could "get him out of a tight spot," and he wore it for that pragmatic reason. Whether his motives were that pure or not, his picture is one of a combat leader, not a manager of violence. The effect of that was not lost on his subordinates nor his enemy.

³⁰ Ridgway address to CGSC class.

³¹ Ibid, pg 204.

³² Ibid, pg 97-98.

³³ Ibid, pg 204.

³⁴ Frequently misspelled, the term “Hua” has come to mean many things. It began as an acronym: Head Up A__.

³⁵ Ridgway address to CGSC.

³⁶ Ibid. Ridgway highlights the importance of personally seeing how logistical operations are progressing. He emphasizes the importance of “...being there to see” the best in rations, support, maintenance, etc.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ This is the author’s assessment based generally on his research into Ridgway’s methods of command and specifically on his address to the 1966 CGSC class. Ridgway emphasizes these two points repeatedly. In one instance he tells of violating orders of his superiors so that he could have a deputy commander.

³⁹ Ridgway, The Korean War, pg 162-183 provides an eclectic overview of those areas with which Ridgway concerned himself immediately after replacing MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the Far East. In this passage he contrasts his behavior as the Eighth Army commander from his responsibilities as the theater commander—what we would today call a Commander in Chief (CINC).

⁴⁰ Ridgway address to CGSC class; and Ridgway, Matthew and Walter Winton, Military Review “Troop Leadership at the Operational Level: The Eighth Army in Korea,” Apr 90, pg 57. Ridgway emphasizes that leadership techniques don’t change much as one changes echelon.

⁴¹ Paret, pg 86. In WW I MacArthur, then a colonel, donned a private’s uniform and joined the soldiers for an attack from the trenches. Paret, pg 172-176. As an inter-war years Chief of Staff he had personally challenged both the President and Congress about funding for the Army. Paret, 272-273. In WW II he had to be essentially ordered to evacuate the Philippines during fighting with the Japanese.

⁴² Ibid, pg 542..

⁴³ James, Clayton, The Years of MacArthur, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), pg 558. Ridgway, Soldiers, pg 109.

⁴⁴ Ridgway address to CGSC.

⁴⁵ Ridgway, The Korean War, pg 85 and 101; Ridgway, Soldier, pg206-207 and 209.

⁴⁶ LTG(R) Caldwell response to author’s question during Infantry School Warfighting Conference, 22 Apr 88. Caldwell, a lieutenant in the Korean War, said that even at his level he sensed the change in the attitude of the *army* when Ridgway assumed command. (Author’s emphasis.) See also Fehrenbach, T.R., This Kind of War, (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), pg 365-366 and 369.

⁴⁷ Perry, pg 47.

⁴⁸ Yates, Lawrence A., Power Pack: US Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966, (Leavenworth Paper #15, 1988), pg 86.

⁴⁹ Palmer, Bruce, Memorandum, Office of the Chief of Staff, "Report of Stability Operations, Dominican Republic," 28 Jan 1971. Palmer indicates in the body of the memorandum that he personally wrote the commander's summary attached to the memorandum.

⁵⁰ Ridgway The Korean War, pg 141-156, seems to indicate that Ridgway did share this appreciation fairly well. His service in the Allied Airborne Army during WW II and his position as Army DCSOPS immediately prior to service in Korea further enhanced his understanding of the requirements and constraints placed on any situation by political and strategic concerns. See also his comments in his taped address to the 1966 CGSC class in which when responding to a question he says that officers must "stay clear of political issues."

⁵¹ Palmer, pg C-7.

⁵² Ibid, pg C-1 to C-2; and Yates, pg 86.

⁵³ Yates, pg 86-87. British Colonel Peter Williams, in an address to AMSP 97-98 about the Falklands/Malvinas War, made a similar point when discussing the command relationships during the cruise to and initial fighting during the Falklands War. Brigadier Julian Thompson had no superior with him initially and was forced to both fight the battles and report to his strategic leaders. His responsibilities were markedly simplified when Major General Moore arrived on scene to assume that role of tactical-strategic interface. See Hastings, Max, and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1983), pg 270-271. (Although the author will later stress that it's difficult to find valuable insights into operational command between armies, this is one case in which the author believes one can.) Franks referred to a similar principle (albeit when discussing tactical operations) during a Warfighter Seminar with the AMSP 97-98 class on Feb 98.

⁵⁴ Interestingly, Masterson had assumed command of the operation unbeknownst to the two senior officers already in the area. Dare and Dougherty returned from a meeting with Bennet to find Masterson aboard the flagship. The two officers were informed that the CINCLANT had activated a JTF the previous day and that Masterson had been in command since then. Yates, pg 67-68.

⁵⁵ Yates, pg 87; and Palmer, pg C-7.

⁵⁶ This is the author's assessment from studying several joint operations led by commanders of various services. Senior naval officers command from their flagship and senior Air Force officers command from their air operations center. Senior marines and soldiers command from forward command posts or with mobile command groups. This arrangement is functional when commanding the forces of one's own service. It is not always so when commanding a joint force.

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- ⁵⁷ One can track the assignments of senior officers using an Excel spreadsheet at <http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/m13/fobtop.htm>. Most officers in joint billets likely to command joint forces or those in service billets likely to command JTFs hold three or four star rank.
- ⁵⁸ Palmer, pg C-3, C-5, and C-7; and Yates, pg 88.
- ⁵⁹ Palmer, pg C-1, C-8, and C-9; and Yates, pg 86.
- ⁶⁰ Ridgway address to CGSC.
- ⁶¹ Palmer, pg C-14; and Yates, pg 173-174.
- ⁶² Palmer, pg C-1.
- ⁶³ Author's CGSC 96-97 notes on military relations with the media.
- ⁶⁴ Tystad, Doug, conversation with author, Feb 98. Tystad, a former brigade and combat battalion commander was concerned that he didn't need the distraction of a high level commander present with him when he fought an enemy.
- ⁶⁵ A summary of the change in powers associated with this act is available in Perry, pg 335-344.
- ⁶⁶ A734 "Joint Forces Command" class discussion. Woodward, Bob, The Commander's, (New York: Pocket Star Books, 1992), pg 81-82. Woodward's early chapters (9-12) generally provide an overview of Powell's influence within the Bush administration.
- ⁶⁷ An example of a multi-service operation vice a joint one can be found in Perry, pg 320-322 where he offers a critique of Operation Urgent Fury that alleges that operation was joint in name only. Vouno, Carl, address to CGCS class "Operation Just Cause," 8 Jan 90, Eisenhower Hall, contends that Urgent Fury did not include superfluous forces simply to placate service desires for the limelight. Tape of this address available in CARL archives.
- ⁶⁸ JP 5.0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, (Joint Electronic Library Compact Disk, May 1997), pg 1-9.
- ⁶⁹ Franks, Fred M., electronic mail note to author, dtd 3 Apr 98.
- ⁷⁰ Woodward, pg 52, 58, and 62-63.
- ⁷¹ With respect to this phenomenon as it relates to Thurman see Donnelly, Thomas, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991))pg 54
- ⁷² Woodward, pg 71.
- ⁷³ Woodward, pg 72.

⁷⁴ Cole, Ronald H., Operation Just Cause, (Washington DC: Joint History Office, 1995), pg 14 and 22, and Donnelly, et al, pg 56-62.

⁷⁵ Vouno, Carl, address to CGSC Class. Vouno indicates that Thurman personally made the decisions about the timing and selections of fights to secure both embassies and hotels harboring frightened journalists. Vouno says that Thurman termed himself as the "Officer-in-Charge" of embassies and hotels. This is hardly the title of a detached third party. The author's assertion that there were two commanders who shared operational responsibility is buttressed by Huntoon, David, conversation with author, 5 May 98. Huntoon, who was an XVIII Corps planner for both Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm insists that Thurman operated at some times as the operational commander and that Stiener did, too. He said that "anyone who classifies Steiner as merely the tactical commander is wrong."

⁷⁶ In his address to the CGSC class Vouno says that no national leaders interfered with the operation once it started. Depending on how one defines "interfered" this is true. Donnelly, et al and Cole make clear that the CJCS, likely acting on express or implied requirements from the President or SecDef required modifications to planned or ongoing operations based on strategic concerns. Examples of this are were the ROE for entering possible diplomatic residences, the timetable for addressing a hostage situation, and the use of rock music outside the papal nuncio both as a psyops weapon and jammer.

⁷⁷ Such action by strategic leaders is hardly unheard of. President Johnson's efforts to control bombing targets in Vietnam is well documented. President Ford attempted to direct disengagement of the tactical ground forces during the Mayaguez rescue when such action would likely have guaranteed the destruction of the reinforced Marine rifle company on Koh Tang island. In both these cases the strategic leaders lacked anything approaching the ability to monitor discrete tactical events in real time. If strategic leaders were willing to attempt to micromanage the fight to that level with less than timely communications capability, it's easy to imagine the Siren's song calling for strategic management of modern fights to very low levels.

⁷⁸ Cole, pg 25.

⁷⁹ Ibid, pg 47-48.

⁸⁰ Ibid, pg 31. Max actually quotes Secretary Cheney in describing the chain of command as as "short and clean as possible."

⁸¹ Donnelly, et al, pg 96-97, and Cole, pg 27-28. One Marine officer died as a result of the attacks which included the assault of another officer's wife.

⁸² Cole, pg 21.

⁸³ Yates, pg 145-150.

⁸⁴ Cole, pg 66-69.

⁸⁵ The reader's apparent surprise indicates the potential presence of two flawed assumptions. One, that we are observing heaven, and, two, that no trips to the bathroom are required there.

⁸⁶ Swain, Richard, Lucky War, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994), pg 71-96, describe the efforts of the Third Army staff. If that staff did any true campaign planning it was done for the CINC and simply accomplished in a different headquarters.

⁸⁷ This may have been Schwarzkopf's greatest achievement. He was forced to deal with issues on the tactical, operational, and strategic level in his continuing efforts in this regard. (At the tactical level, the British didn't want to participate in the Marine attack as the initial task organization would have required. Schwarzkopf swapped them into VII Corps in exchange for the Tiger Brigade. At the operational level, the Arab Forces indicated that they would not attack into Iraq, so Schwarzkopf designed his plan to allow for this. At the strategic level, Iraqi attacks on Israel could have drawn them into the fight and destroyed the coalition. To counter this Schwarzkopf dedicated extensive resources to suppressing SCUD launches in the western part of Iraq after some pressure from his strategic superiors to do so.)

⁸⁸ Schwarzkopf, Norman, It Doesn't Take a Hero, (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), pg 273-279

⁸⁹ Schwarzkopf moved his sleeping quarters down to a room proximate to his war room so that he wouldn't be far away. Atkinson, Rick, Crusade, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), pg 21-22.

⁹⁰ Yeosock had recently finished serving as the PM, Saudi Arabian National Guard. In that position he became familiar with Saudi culture and the personalities of several members of the ruling family.

⁹¹ Schwarzkopf, pg 373-374.

⁹² Atkinson, pg 426-428.

⁹³ Franks, Freddie, conversation with the author.

⁹⁴ Atkinson, pg 440-441; Gordon, Michael, and Bernard Trainor, The General's War, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1994), pg 397-398; Swain, pg 254; Franks, Freddie and Tom Clancy, Into the Storm, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1997), pg 366-369.

⁹⁵ Franks, conversation with author, provides the best summary of tactical reality versus the "briefing reality." Franks found no reason why the CINC in his role as the LCC, hadn't gathered at least the two Army corps commanders and discussed their view of the battlefield and then shared his vision of end state. Such an act would have involved significant effort to transport at least these three senior officers to one spot on the battlefield along with the establishment of a communications system that would've allowed each of them to maintain a link to their commands. Even having said that, such efforts are exactly the purpose of the large staffs that support such commanders. Hindsight certainly tells us that such a meeting would've been beneficial in the extreme. See also Franks, pg 417-418 for a similar discussion about the utility of at least the two army corps commanders speaking to each other. The author acknowledges that Schwarzkopf should have generally focused his attention on coalition maintenance—generally considered to be a or the center of gravity at his level. Schwarzkopf did this and his efforts apparently yielded tangible results. He also wished to ensure a timely and quality link to his strategic superiors. Again, this he did well. The fact remains, however, that personal interaction with at least his main effort corps commander, if not both Army or all three corps commanders (Luck,

Franks, and Boomer), would likely have given all a much clearer picture of what was happening and a shared understanding of where the CINC wanted everyone to go. Schwarzkopf had in Waller as close to an alter ego as was available for a leader like Schwarzkopf. He could have sent Waller forward to gain that picture and translate the CINC's vision to the corps commanders, but instead reprimanded Waller when he thought Waller was doing just that with the primary staff in Third Army (Atkinson, pg 427-428). Conversely, he could have left Waller at the command post with fairly explicit instructions and himself journeyed forward. In either case the traveler likely faced round trip transit time (given CINC assets) of under twelve hours. It's simply not possible to justify his unwillingness to go forward at least once based primarily on his need to maintain the coalition and communications with his strategic superiors.

⁹⁶ US News and World Report, Triumph Without Victory, (New York: Times Books, 1992), pg 109. See also Atkinson, pg 67 for anecdotal evidence of this. When LTG Calvin Waller was directed to deploy to Saudi Arabia and assume duties as the Deputy CINC, he called about 0730 Saudi time to talk to Schwarzkopf. The CENTCOM staff, including MG Johnston, the Chief of Staff, refused to awaken the CINC to talk on the phone. "That would be terrible," Johnston told Waller. In Schwarzkopf's defense, Waller later wielded this kind of authority, though in the author's opinion it was more because he took it then it was delegated to him.

⁹⁷ Atkinson, pg 20-22.

⁹⁸ Gordon and Trainor, pg 129.

⁹⁹ Schwarzkopf, pg 128.

¹⁰⁰ Matthews, James K., and Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: US Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), pg 12.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, pg 21-22.

¹⁰² Schwarzkopf, pg. 323; and Matthews and Holt , pg 22.

¹⁰³ A CBS news crew who took this action had the privilege of reporting on their capture *after* the war. For a reader who simply lacks any other useful activity, see also Hackworth, David, Hazardous Duty, (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1996), pg 21-98, for an arrogant account of his travels around the battlefield gaining insights mere mortal beings lacked the capability to perceive, and of his taunting of American soldiers in the performance of their security duties.

¹⁰⁴ Scales, Certain Victory, (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1994), pg 138.

¹⁰⁵ Atkinson, pg 159-162.

¹⁰⁶ Scales, pg 111.

¹⁰⁷ Schwarzkopf, 446; Atkinson, pg 392.

¹⁰⁸ Trainor and Gordon, pg 471-473.

¹⁰⁹ Bolger, Dan, Savage Peace, (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993), pg 287-289.

¹¹⁰ Arnold, Steven, address to CGSC, "Operation Restore Hope," Eisenhower Hall.

¹¹¹ Arnold address to CGSC. Arnold says that decisions made in Washington went to the CENTCOM, to I MEF (the JTF), then to ACOM, FORSCOM, XVIII Corps, and finally to Hq, 10th ID.

¹¹² Washecheck, David, conversation with author. Washecheck served as the Deputy Engineer Officer on the joint staff. He related to the author decisions by Johnston to "take out" various arms caches and facilities after his staff presented evidence of their use for prohibited purposes.

¹¹³ Arnold address to CGSC. Arnold indicates that he initially expected to have to "fight the warlords."

¹¹⁴ Bolger, pg 283 and 285. The UN rules are different for peacekeeping (chapter 6) than for peacemaking (chapter 7). The latter generally carries with it looser ROE and the participants bring with them more firepower. In this case, a few of MG Arnold's decisions about task organization indicate that he was focused on humanitarian relief and not conflict. His decision to leave his artillery behind is one such decision. See Arnold address to CGSC class.

¹¹⁵ CALL action officer summary (undated) obtained from the CALL limited access data base (copy in possession of the author). The author has some personal knowledge of the speed with which this transition took place as some of his soldiers were detailed to serve on MG Montgomery's personal staff.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Bolger, pg 297.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, and Call Action Officer Summary.

¹¹⁹ CALL Lessons Learned Report, "US Army Operations in Support of UNOSOM II," 4 May 93-31 Mar 94, pg 5-6; Philadelphia Enquirer Blackhawk Down web site. online at <http://www3.phillynews.com/packages/somalia/sitemap.asp>, "Blackhawk Down" Bolger, pg 307-309. The efforts of the special operations forces to ensure that they worked for no one other than God or the national command authority should have garnered them honorable mention from the fictitious Douhet foundation. This penchant for forces/components who believe themselves capable of delivering strategic results with one action or series of actions, to attempt to avoid division, further sub-task organization, and supervision by mere humans, seems to find itself present in many military failures. Perhaps despite all our utopian arguments that we can achieve unity of effort without submitting to pre-Sengian, stone age unity of command are flawed.

¹²⁰ Blackhawk Down web site. Handwritten note from Garrison to Congressman Murtha. Item XVI. Image of this note available online at <http://www3.phillynews.com/packages/somalia/dec14/garrison.asp>.

¹²¹ Blackhawk Down web site. One oversteps a clear understanding of the situation if he or she postulates that this operation by itself caused the US pullout from Somalia. By the same token, if one ignores the pivotal role the results of this operation played in that decision to pull out, one suffers from the same degree of misunderstanding.

¹²² Bolger, pg 300-301 and 328-330.

¹²³ Franks, e mail to author.

¹²⁴ Reilly, Greg, conversation with author, Apr 98. Border incidents in Germany at this time produced Serious Incident Reports that immediately reached the CINC's desk. Bonifas was the senior officer killed by a group of North Koreans when supervising a tree cutting detail in the neutral territory of the Joint Security Area. This incident raised readiness postures of forces around the world.

¹²⁵ US forces have frequently sought tactical insights from the conflicts of other nations.

¹²⁶ Puttmann, William, conversation with author regarding an early draft of this work.

¹²⁷ Gawrich, conversation with author.

¹²⁸ Buche, Joseph P., A Formula for How to Screw Up the Army: Take No Risks and Make No Mistakes, (SAMS Monograph, Jan 98), pg15-16 . The author advances a set of significant differences between civilian and military work environments.

¹²⁹ Franks e mail message to author. See also Ridgway's address to CGSC class. Ridgway talks of his most difficult decisions begin the one's when not engaged in battle, "It is easy to gamble with other men's money--maybe more with other men's lives--particularly when your own is in no great danger." He later stated that, "the hardest decisions are not the ones in the heat of battle," but those when planning and confronted with "needless sacrifice of other men's lives."

¹³⁰ Holder, letter to author, specifically uses the phrase "impose their will" when he advocates the operational commander moving around the battlefield observing his forces.

¹³¹ Perry, pg 32-33

¹³² Ridgway address to CGSC class.

¹³³ TRADOC Pam 525-5, Force XXI Operations, (Fort Monroe, VA: Hq, TRADOC, Aug 1994), pg 2-8.

¹³⁴ Hartzog, GEN William address to SAMS 97-98. (Notes in possession of the author.)

¹³⁵ Army Digitization Office (ADO) Homepage online at http://www.ado.army.mil/DOCS/new_page_1.htm. Intranet capabilities link.

¹³⁶ ADO Homepage. Fielding briefing link.

¹³⁷ Toffler, Heidi and Alvin, War and Anti-War, (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993), pg 103-104. Traditionally technological and expensive innovations generate the incentive to find responses. Waging Third Wave War (as Toffler calls it) may remove various "flanks" open to enemy attack, but it creates some, too. Consider the possibility that an enemy could learn of a critical part used in the US AMC's C-17 fleet. By manipulating the information system that tracks the usage, quantity on hand, and, subsequently, the number ordered, an enemy could significantly influence any US strategic deployment in 2010. See also generally Stoll, Cliff, The Cuckoo's Egg, (New York: Pocket Books, 1989) for an overview of hacking into DoD computers.

¹³⁸ Hugh's assessment is based on the author's survey of C² systems in the fielding pipeline. Our communications are generally protected by communications security systems, but this doesn't serve to verify the information, just the authorized access to send or receive on a given net.

¹³⁹ Class discussion AMSP 97-98 seminar one on airpower

¹⁴⁰ Krulak, GEN Charles address to 97-98 CGSC class. The Army Digitization Office Campaign Plan does include sections that deal with sister service interoperability. The author tends to put more credence into the skepticism of the USMC Commandant than the optimism of a lifeless document.

¹⁴¹ ADO Homepage, and author conversation with COL Tystad. CGSC annual exercise, Prairie Warrior 98 will work the issue of digitized force working for an analog force. ADO homepage talks of efforts to synch with Germany and UK.

¹⁴² TRADOC Pam 525-5, pg 3-5 to 3-8.

¹⁴³ TRADOC Pam 525-5, pg 2-3 to 2-6.

¹⁴⁴ von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pg 69.

¹⁴⁵ In many ways our experience and some of our difficulties in Somalia reflects phenomenon and its impacts.

¹⁴⁶ Toffler, pg 72-73, 76-77; TRADOC Pam 525-5, pg 2-8.

¹⁴⁷ AMSP 97-98 Seminar 1 class discussion

¹⁴⁸ Puttman note on draft manuscript.

¹⁴⁹ Author's notes from CGSC 96-97 A544 "Information Operations" class discussion and video tape portraying "Aerobureau One" shown to AMSP 97-98 5 May 98. Commercial firms already advertise their ability to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice in specialized aircraft and produce network news quality features within 24 hours.

¹⁵⁰ This prognostication is the author's. Timely information is the hot commodity today. The competition to provide information in a more timely manner than one's competitors will lead to speed being the key to success. (Minor mistakes can be corrected later and forwarded with an apology.) As this becomes more commonplace, though, all the information consumers will become more skeptical

about the validity of the timely information they receive (and for which they pay). Credibility will become the hot commodity. With this in mind, OPSEC will experience a paradigm shift. We now worry that someone we don't want to know will find out, thus spoiling our OPSEC. As information availability and speed builds, and therefore builds the validity skepticism that will naturally follow, publication of our sensitive information will not harm us, per se. That information will competing with other information for credibility. In short, during this credibility crisis our sensitive information will be able to hide in plain sight.

¹⁵¹ Bolger, pg 387. Bolger says that "the media remains more of a mirror than a window, an, in the final analysis, videotapes do not make decisions. Leaders decide...and they choose based on their sensing and professional judgment." The author finds that a fairly good assessment.

¹⁵² Holder, Don, letter to author.

¹⁵³ Bruce quotes directly from Ridgway, address to CGSC class. Ridgway went further by saying that he believed that this would remain true "notwithstanding the future impact of TV on combat."

¹⁵⁴ Holder, letter to author, states, "I maintain that the commander (at any level) has to make a personal plan for command. That unwritten plan covers his own actions—resting included—for the 24 to 48 hours ahead and must balance information-gathering needs with decision-making requirements. It also has to anticipate his position within the command.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid

¹⁵⁶ Ridgway address to CGSC. In his address he alludes to a deliberate focusing of presence given an intimate understanding of one's subordinates. A commander could assess when his subordinates would benefit from personal visits and when they didn't "require" a visit.

¹⁵⁷ Arnold address to CGSC class. Arnold emphasized the utility of the command newspaper published by 10th ID when deployed for Restore Hope.

¹⁵⁸ Franks E mail. Franks related his belief that no future commander will have the latitude Eisenhower enjoyed to make a decision of strategic import. (The decision to launch D Day was Eisenhower's alone.)

¹⁵⁹ FM 100-5, pg 2-2.

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